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ADAPTING TO A 4°C WORLD
by Karrigan Börk, Karen Bradshaw, Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Robin Kundis Craig,
Sarah Fox, Josh Galperin, Keith Hirokawa, Shi-Ling Hsu, Katrina Kuh, Kevin Lynch,
Michele Okoh, Jessica Owley, Melissa Powers, Shannon Roesler, J.B. Ruhl,
James Salzman, David Takacs, and Clifford J. Villa
SUMMARY
The Paris Agreement’s goal to hold warming to 1.5°-2°C above pre-industrial levels now appears unrealistic. Profs. Robin Kundis Craig and J.B. Ruhl have recently argued that because a 4°C world may be likely,
we must recognize the disruptive consequences of such a world and respond by reimagining governance
structures to meet the challenges of adapting to it. In this latest in a biannual series of essays, they and other
members of the Environmental Law Collaborative explore what 4°C might mean for a variety of current legal
doctrines, planning policies, governance structures, and institutions.

P

articipants at the Environmental Law Collaborative’s
(ELC’s) most recent meeting in July 2021 were asked
to consider the adaptation challenges of the worstcase climate scenario: a world that warms by 4 degrees
Celsius (°C) (or more) by 2100. As environmental law
professors, we remain dedicated to the study and support
of laws and policies designed to mitigate greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions and avert the worst-case scenario. But
we cannot ignore what scientific studies and newer climate
models show. The Paris Agreement’s goal to hold warming
to 1.5°-2°C above pre-industrial levels now appears unrealistic.1 In the United States, regulatory inaction and political
gridlock frustrate efforts to implement the decarbonization
measures that we need now to prevent the warming predicted by climate models. At the international level, the
commitment and cooperation necessary for dramatic emissions reductions also appear unlikely.
To frame and inspire discussion about the consequences
of a 4°C world, participants read a recent article by two
ELC members, Robin Kundis Craig and J.B. Ruhl, who

argue that because a 4°C world is likely, we must recognize
the disruptive consequences of such a world and respond by
reimagining governance structures to meet the challenges
of adaptation.2 A 4°C world is one marked by dramatic
sea-level rise, devastating heat waves, extreme drought,
increased flooding, food insecurity, and radical shifts in
ecosystems and biodiversity. Some communities may not
be able to adapt; they may simply have to move. Adapting
our laws and governance structures to physical and social
disruption at this scale requires transformative thinking.
In the essays that follow, ELC participants explore what
it means to adapt to a 4°C world. Some essays highlight
the inadequacy of current legal doctrines, planning policies, and governance structures to meet the adaptation
challenges ahead. Others examine the need to rethink laws
and institutions that govern ecosystem services and issues
of biodiversity. And some focus on issues of social equity
and environmental injustice. Although each essay makes
its own contribution, they all share a deep concern for the
future and an urgency to mitigate not only the emissions
that drive us closer to 4°C, but also the serious harms that
we will suffer if we fail to plan for the worst-case scenario.

Authors’ Note: The Environmental Law Collaborative (ELC)
comprises a rotating group of law professors who assemble every other year to think, discuss, and write on an
important and intriguing theme in environmental law. The
goals of this meeting are both scholarly and practical, as
ELC participants seek to use their disparate areas of scholarly expertise to study trends and important events in the
law and ultimately to improve the environmental conditions
of the world in which we live.

I.

1.

For a summary of the Paris Agreement and links to the document, see
United Nations Climate Change, The Paris Agreement, https://unfccc.
int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement
(last
visited Jan. 6, 2022).
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Western Water Rights in a 4°C Future

This section was authored by Kevin Lynch, Associate Professor of
Law with Tenure, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver;
Shi-Ling Hsu, D’Alemberte Professor of Law, Florida State
University College of Law; and Karrigan Börk, Acting Professor
of Law, University of California, Davis School of Law.
Western water rights reflect a short and stable climate history, but that period of stability is ending. Looming climate
2.

J.B. Ruhl & Robin Kundis Craig, 4°C, 106 Minn. L. Rev. 191 (2021).
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change of 4°C will produce not only higher temperatures,
but decreased snowpack, shifts in runoff patterns,3 and
the dramatic shrinkage of giant reservoirs.4 The climatic
changes that have already traumatized the West will only
intensify and cross even more dangerous thresholds,5 necessitating the deliberate adaptation of water rights systems.

A.

Hydrology in a Changing Climate

A climate-changed future is inherently uncertain, but the
general consensus predicts a dire future for water supply in the arid West. Precipitation patterns are the biggest source of uncertainty, due to the potential increase
in extreme weather events.6 This could both increase and
decrease water supplies as larger snowstorms could dump
more precipitation in some years, while other impacts on
the snowpack would lead to declines. However, higher
temperatures in the summer and fall are expected to offset
potential increases in snowpack in most years, leading to
an overall trend of less water supply in a warming future.7
Temperature increases along the Colorado River may
reduce flows by more than 20% mid-century and 35% by
2100,8 reducing vital water supplies to seven states and 23
tribal nations.9
Intra- and inter-annual variability will continue as a
hallmark of western water systems. In the Colorado River
basin, for example, the impacts of a changing climate are
already apparent as the current megadrought fueled by
climate change recently led to the first ever federal water
shortage declaration.10 Experts urge us to plan for even
worse impacts to come.11
Looking beyond the Colorado River basin, a 4°C world
leads to large declines in snowpack in the western United
States, perhaps in the range of a 40% decrease due to gen-

3.

Abigail C. Lute et al., Projected Changes in Snowfall Extremes and Interannual
Variability of Snowfall in the Western United States, 51 Water Res. Rsch.
960, 969-70 (2015).
4. Jaweed Kaleem & Thomas Curwen, “Unrecognizable.” Lake Mead, a Lifeline
for Water in Los Angeles and the West, Tips Toward Crisis, L.A. Times (July 11,
2021, 5:01 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-07-11/
lake-mead-hoover-dam-drought-nevada-arizona-california.
5. Hervé Douville et al., Water Cycle Changes, in Climate Change 2021: The
Physical Science Basis. Working Group I Contribution to the Sixth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change 8-1, 8-96, 8-119 to 8-121 (Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2021).
6. Linda O. Mearns et al., The North American Regional Climate Change Assessment Program: Overview of Phase I Results, 98 Bull. Am. Meteorological
Soc’y 1337, 1358-59 (2012).
7. Bradley Udall & Jonathan Overpeck, The Twenty-First Century Colorado
River Hot Drought and Implications for the Future, 53 Water Res. Rsch.
2404, 2414-15 (2017).
8. Id. at 2404.
9. Water Education Foundation, Colorado River, https://www.watereducation.
org/aquapedia/colorado-river (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
10. Kirk Siegler, Colorado River, Lifeline of the West, Sees Historic Water Shortage Declaration, NPR (Aug. 22, 2021, 5:13 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2021/08/22/1030154245/colorado-river-lifeline-of-the-west-sees-historicwater-shortage-declaration.
11. John Fleck & Brad Udall, Managing Colorado River Risk, 372 Science 885,
885 (2021), available at https://www.science.org/doi/epdf/10.1126/science.abj5498.
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erally less precipitation and shifts from snow to rain.12 The
snowpack in the Sierra Nevada mountains recently hit
its lowest point going back at least 500 years.13 Decreasing snowpack reduces water availability throughout hot,
dry summers, resulting in significant seasonal water shortages. One recent study even projects that critical mountain
ranges in the western United States may lose their snowpacks for years at a time by mid-century.14
Warmer temperatures and less frequent precipitation
also mean that even normal snowpacks do not necessarily
bring relief from droughts. For example, Colorado’s 2021
snowpack was almost normal, but because soils in many
western watersheds were unusually dry, most of the water
went into the soils and not into streams, rivers, and reservoirs for human uses.15 Another driver of drought in a
warming world is the increase in evapotranspiration caused
by higher temperatures as plants need more water and
evaporation from rivers and reservoirs increases.16 These
factors point toward a drying and warming future in the
southwestern United States, particularly in the Colorado
River basin.

B.

Water Law Historically Adapted to Hydrology

The changes in the West’s hydrology are very likely to produce changes in water law, which has historically evolved
in response to differing climatic conditions.17 Early U.S.
water law decisions18 drew heavily on English water law,
establishing a system based on riparian water rights. Riparian rights come from ownership of land that abuts a watercourse, and they are generally limited to reasonable use of
the water on the riparian land. Riparian rights have many
other limits; they do not allow storage or long-distance
transportation of water, for example, and they are not absolute, leading to some uncertainty about the quantity and
reliability of water. These limitations meant that riparian
rights were poorly suited to western hydrologic regimes,
where seasonal (and total) water availability patterns

12. David R. Easterling et al., Precipitation Change in the United States, in Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment,
Volume I 207, 218 (Donald J. Wuebbles et al. eds., U.S. Global Change
Research Program 2017), https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR_Ch7_Precipitation.pdf.
13. Soumaya Belmecheri et al., Multi-Century Evaluation of Sierra Nevada
Snowpack, 6 Nature Climate Change 2, 2 (2016), available at https://
www.nature.com/articles/nclimate2809.pdf.
14. Erica R. Siirila-Woodburn et al., A Low-to-No Snow Future and Its Impacts
on Water Resources in the Western United States, 2 Nature Revs. Earth &
Env’t 800 (2021), available at https://www.nature.com/articles/s43017021-00219-y.epdf.
15. Miguel Otárola, Colorado’s Snowpack Was Almost Normal This Winter, but It
May Not Be Enough Water for the Year, CPR News (Apr. 2, 2021), https://
www.cpr.org/2021/04/02/colorados-snowpack-was-almost-normal-thiswinter-but-it-may-not-be-enough-water-for-the-year/.
16. Michael F. Wehner et al., Droughts, Floods, and Wildfires, in Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume
I, supra note 12, at 231, 232, 236-39, 247, https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/CSSR_Ch8_Drought_Floods_and_Wildfires.pdf.
17. Joseph W. Dellapenna, United States: The Allocation of Surface Waters, in
The Evolution of the Law and Politics of Water 189, 189 (Joseph W.
Dellapenna & Joyeeta Gupta eds., Springer 2009).
18. See, e.g., Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
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require storage and transportation of water to maximize
the benefits of available water.
California developed a system of appropriative rights
based on the use of water, not on land ownership. Appropriative rights allow water storage and transportation, and
these advantages led all of the states west of the Mississippi to adopt some version of appropriative rights. Coastal
states like California and Washington, and midwestern
states like Kansas and Nebraska, tend to blend riparian
and appropriative doctrines, while drier western states like
Colorado embrace a purer appropriative rights approach
that does not recognize riparian rights at all.19
Appropriative water rights systems give priority to the
first user of the water, an approach often styled “first in
time, first in right,” so that later users may not get their full
allocation of water in dry years. Maintaining appropriative
water rights requires constant vigilance; these rights can be
lost through disuse or to other users who take the water.
Water rights are tied to the land and to its use; transferring the right to someone else or changing the place or use
of the water generally requires permission of a state-level
water agency.
The appropriative rights and the blended appropriative/
riparian rights approaches are both inherently based on
historic hydrology and patterns of land use and ownership.
This can make them a barrier to climate adaptation. For
example, the first-in-time approach gives priority to the
earliest water users, regardless of how well-suited these uses
are to a changing climate or changing societal needs. Historical aspects of water rights thus sometimes allow lowervalue agricultural uses to take priority over domestic and
industrial uses. Formally, water use is generally required
to be reasonable and beneficial, but as a practical matter,
courts and water boards rarely rein in inefficiency.20 Recent
droughts have shown many existing uses of water to be
even more anachronistic. Because most water in the West
is already appropriated, in a drier, climate-changed future,
a reordering of priorities seems necessary.
Consider California’s agricultural sector. Though productive and valuable, California agriculture constitutes
about 80% of the state’s human water use21 while accounting for less than 3% of the state’s gross domestic product
(GDP).22 The ag sector has become significantly more efficient in the past 30 years, using less total water to produce
more agricultural value.23 Nevertheless, in some cases and
in some years, California water currently used in agriculture would be more valuable as drinking water or as water
to support ecosystems. Growing fewer almonds or mak19. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (Colo. 1882).
20. Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search
for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 Env’t L. 919, 922 (1998).
21. California Department of Water Resources, Agricultural Water Use Efficiency, https://water.ca.gov/Programs/Water-Use-And-Efficiency/AgriculturalWater-Use-Efficiency (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
22. University of Arkansas Division of Agriculture, Economic Impact of Agriculture, California, https://economic-impact-of-ag.uada.edu/california (last
visited Jan. 6, 2022).
23. Ellen Hanak & Jeffrey Mount, PPIC Water Policy Center, Water
Use in California (2019), https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/jtfwater-use.pdf.
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ing less milk and cheese will likely be necessary in a 4°C
world. A successful water rights system should encourage
and accommodate these shifts.
Further, use-it-or-lose-it requirements disincentivize
water conservation or land use changes that could free up
water for other users. Riparian rights give strong rights to
riparian landowners, a system that tends to maintain existing land uses and perpetuate distributive justice concerns.
Use-based appropriative rights inherently value use over
conservation or other “passive” uses, such as fish and wildlife habitat.
Finally, although existing water rights systems have succeeded in spurring economic development, they have done
so at great environmental and social cost. The extensive,
massive water diversions that have made California the
most productive agricultural state in the United States24
also completely transformed the entire Central Valley and
altered the ecology of much of the state, driving many
native species to extinction.

C.

Can Water Law Adapt to a Warmer Future?

How is the western United States to cope with a world
that is warmer by as much as 4°C and chronically short
of water? We suggest three steps, emphasizing that these
represent just a few out of many constructive actions that
might be taken to prepare for a much warmer, much drier
American West.
New diversions must be evaluated under a conception of
reasonableness that includes climate change. Western water
law has always embedded notions of reasonableness,25
and has almost always, at least formally if not in practice,
been predicated on some consideration of public interest.26
These terms have been either ill-defined or defined in a way
that gives short shrift to considerations of conservation
and passive uses.27 The phrase “public interest” has been
infrequently deployed to protect passive or instream uses,
and has in some cases simply been ignored in water permit applications.28 Notions of reasonableness or beneficial
use must29 take account of future scarcity of water and an
increased need for conservation and domestic uses.
Existing reasonableness requirements must be enforced
as a limit on current water rights. With climate change
already well underway, many existing allocations of water
are economically inefficient, with too little regard for
nonagricultural uses. Because most water in the West is

24. U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, Cash Receipts
by State, https://data.ers.usda.gov/reports.aspx?ID=17843#P9c68c7a5c435
4e2998c56e99e444d414_5_17iT0R0x5 (last updated Dec. 1, 2021).
25. See Cal. Const. art. X, §2.
26. Mark Squillace, Restoring the Public Interest in Western Water Law, 2020
Utah L. Rev. 627, 652-54.
27. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, and the Future of Water Law,
67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 257, 277-79 (1990); see generally Janet C. Neuman,
Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in
Western Water Use, 28 Env’t L. 919 (1998).
28. Squillace, supra note 26, at 659, 661.
29. Brian E. Gray, Global Climate Change: Water Supply Risks and Water Management Opportunities, 14 Hastings W.-Nw. J. Env’t L. & Pol’y 1453,
1459-61 (2008).
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already allocated, current water uses must be reexamined
and curtailed if they fail to meet a realistic reasonableness test that accounts for the drier, hotter realities of a
climate-changed future.30
States must actively secure water rights in preparation for
severe and prolonged water shortages in the future. States
must create new institutions to collect water rights as an
effective stockpile against future scarcity, which may present more serious threats than the loss of crops or livestock.
States must migrate some water and water rights into a
governance mechanism that operates outside of traditional water law. A state-chartered trust instrument, such
as a “resources trust,”31 might be legislatively charged with
gathering up water and water rights in order to act as a
water supplier of last resort should the dire need arise. In
hedging against severe and prolonged water shortages,
such a resources trust might employ a range of legal instruments, such as options, to secure future supply.

II.

Designing the 4°C Electricity System
to Achieve a 2°C Future

This section was authored by Melissa Powers, Jeffrey Bain
Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark
Law School.
In August 2021, for the first time ever, the federal government declared a water shortage in the Colorado River
basin.32 While the declaration was not necessarily surprising—the Colorado River has been in an official state of
drought for the past two decades,33 and experts have demonstrated that drought conditions are, in fact, natural for
the Colorado River basin34 —it served as a stark illustration of the “new normal” we have entered due to climate
change. Indeed, Lake Mead’s water level reached lows not
seen since the Hoover Dam was completed in the 1930s,
forcing river managers to impose draconian cuts in water
use that they acknowledged would do little to remedy the
water crisis in the basin.35
Such feckless response measures are not new for the Colorado River; conservationists have long advocated for a fundamentally different approach to Colorado River management
and use that would no longer subordinate the “mighty”
Colorado’s ecological values to its other uses.36 In practice,
however, conservation efforts have proceeded slowly and
incrementally, while uses of the river’s water for drinking and

30. Id. at 1455-58.
31. Shi-Ling Hsu, Climate Triage: A Resources Trust to Address Inequality in a Climate-Changed World, 50 Env’t L. 97, 99-100 (2020), available at https://
myweb.fsu.edu/shsu/publications/50EnvtlL97.pdf.
32. Henry Fountain, In a First, U.S. Declares Shortage on Colorado River,
Forcing Water Cuts, N.Y. Times (Aug. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/08/16/climate/colorado-river-water-cuts.html.
33. Id.
34. National Research Council, Colorado River Basin Water Management: Evaluating and Adjusting to Hydroclimatic Variability 5
(2007).
35. Fountain, supra note 32.
36. See Jonathan Waterman, The American Nile, Nat’l Geographic, https://
www.nationalgeographic.com/americannile/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
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municipal uses, power production, and, especially, irrigated
agriculture, have grown exponentially. Perhaps the severity of
the drought, the declaration of the shortage, and the growing realization that climate change is indeed upon us will
finally lead to a fundamental change in not only Colorado
River management, but development in the Southwest. At a
minimum, it should at least change legal regimes governing
water allocation, which are based on a long-acknowledged
legal fiction overstating the Colorado River’s flow.37
This reckoning regarding water availability should also
spur reevaluation of electricity system decarbonization
models and the role of hydropower in our future energy
system. For the past several years, a number of models have
attempted to assess the technical and economic feasibility of rapidly decarbonizing the electricity system. Some
models focus on pursuing “least-cost” strategies to reduce
GHG emissions38; others aim to demonstrate how the
United States or areas of the United States could “electrify
everything”39 through 100% renewable energy.40
These models affirm that it is technically and economically feasible to decarbonize our energy system. However,
most depend on hydropower to at least some extent, and
they fail to anticipate deep drops in hydroelectric production caused by climate change. But as climate change
both worsens droughts and intensifies precipitation and
flooding, these models and their increasingly unrealistic
assumptions require reconsideration.
For example, while energy models in California predict an 11% decline in hydropower production by 2050,41
actual events suggest hydropower production will be much
lower—an extended drought in 2015 reduced California’s hydropower output by 59% compared to the prior
two decades.42 Models from the Pacific Northwest assume
that hydropower output will remain the same in 2050 as
it was in 2020,43 and predict that hydropower will con37. As Shi-Ling Hsu, Karrigan Börk, and Kevin Lynch argue in another ELC
essay focused on 4ºC (see Part I), this new normal will require reconsideration of the laws governing water rights.
38. See Amber Mahone et al., Energy and Environmental Economics,
Inc., Deep Decarbonization in a High Renewables Future: Updated
Results From the California PATHWAYS Model 2 (2018), https://
www.ethree.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Deep_Decarbonization_
in_a_High_Renewables_Future_CEC-500-2018-012.pdf.
39. David Roberts, The Key to Tackling Climate Change: Electrify Everything,
Vox (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12938086/
electrify-everything.
40. Mark Z. Jacobson et al., 100% Clean and Renewable Wind, Water, and Sunlight (WWS) All-Sector Energy Roadmaps for the 50 United States, 8 Energy
& Env’t Sci. 2093 (2015).
41. Mahone et al., supra note 38, at 25-26. This deep decarbonization model
for California estimates an 11% decrease in hydropower output from 20152050. The authors of the report recognize that hydroelectric production will
likely not decrease linearly and will vary on a seasonal basis, but explain that
their decarbonization model cannot incorporate such variability. Id. As a
result, hydropower is projected to provide about 9% of total energy supply
in 2050, down from about 10% in 2015. Id. at 38, B-16.
42. Craig D. Zamuda et al., Energy Supply, Delivery, and Demand, in Impacts,
Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II 174, 182 (D.R. Reidmiller et al. eds., U.S.
Global Change Research Program 2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.
gov/downloads/NCA4_Ch04_Energy_Full.pdf.
43. See Clean Energy Transition Institute, Meeting the Challenge
of Our Time: Pathways to a Clean Energy Future for the Pacific
Northwest 34 fig.12 (2019).
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stitute nearly 40% of the Pacific Northwest’s electricity
supply in 2050.44 Yet in 2021, drought maps produced by
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) showed that nearly all the hydropower facilities
in the western United States were in drought conditions
not only in late summer, when water levels are often low,
but also in late December, when precipitation would have
been expected to replenish reservoirs.45 Decarbonization
models also fail to account for catastrophic hydropower
system failures resulting from more intense storms and
floods that are causing entire dams to fail.46
Whether due to too much or too little water, the nation’s
hydropower supply is at risk. And these impacts are occurring when average global temperatures have climbed by
only (only!) about 1°C.47 If hydropower is becoming an
increasingly unreliable resource today, it’s hard to imagine
what it will look like at 4°C.
But it’s not just hydropower; the energy system as a
whole will be at risk as average temperatures rise. According to the Fourth National Climate Assessment released in
2018, already vulnerable aspects of our energy infrastructure will face intense challenges, if not complete destruction, at 4°C.48 The impacts will go far beyond droughts
and floods eliminating hydropower production. In a 4°C
future, wildfires caused by electricity transmission lines will
burn those lines down in return49; power plants that need
water for cooling will face forced outages as rivers, lakes,
and ocean waters become too warm to prevent the power
plants from overheating50; severe wind and ice storms will
knock over critical infrastructure or make it inoperable51;
and escalating energy demand during heat waves could
trigger blackouts that result in heat-related deaths.52 While
these consequences have already manifested throughout
the United States, they are still infrequent enough to gen-

44. Id.
45. National Integrated Drought Information System, U.S. Power Plants in
Drought, https://www.drought.gov/sectors/energy#map (last visited Jan. 6,
2022).
46. Henry Fountain, “Expect More”: Climate Change Raises Risk of Dam Failures, N.Y. Times (May 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/
climate/dam-failure-michigan-climate-change.html.
47. Rebecca Hersher, Earth Is Barreling Toward 1.5 Degrees Celsius of Warming, Scientists Warn, NPR (May 26, 2021), https://www.npr.org/
2021/05/26/1000465487/earth-is-barreling-toward-1-5-degrees-celsius-ofwarming-scientists-warn.
48. Zamuda et al., supra note 42, at 176-95.
49. Id. at 183; Associated Press, PG&E Will Bury 10,000 Miles of Power Lines
So They Don’t Spark Wildfires, NPR (July 21, 2021), https://www.npr.
org/2021/07/21/1019058925/utility-bury-power-lines-wildfires-california.
50. Zamuda et al., supra note 42, at 183; Rebecca Hersher, Hot Weather
Spells Trouble for Nuclear Power Plants in Europe, NPR (July 27, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/07/27/632988813/hot-weather-spells-troublefor-nuclear-power-plants.
51. Zamuda et al., supra note 42, at 179; Douglas MacMillan & Beth Reinhard,
Louisiana Power Outages Renew Questions About Utility Giant’s Preparedness
for Storms, Wash. Post (Aug. 31, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/2021/08/31/ida-entergy-hurricane-louisiana-power/; Joshua
Fechter, Texas Cities Weren’t Ready for a Massive Winter Storm in February.
Has That Changed?, Tex. Trib. (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.texastribune.
org/2021/12/06/texas-cities-winter-storm/.
52. Zamuda et al., supra note 42, at 181; Nicholas K. Geranios, Rolling Blackouts Hit Pacific Northwest as Cities Swelter in Record-Breaking Heat Wave,
L.A. Times (June 29, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/
story/2021-06-29/rolling-blackouts-us-northwest-heat-wave.
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erate headlines. They could become commonplace if we
allow a 4°C future to become our reality.
Our current approach to energy system planning and
modeling could make these catastrophic consequences more
likely. The current approach to energy modeling usually
aims to pursue the lowest-cost strategies to achieve various
rates of decarbonization. Through this modeling, energy
planners assume that decarbonization should involve gradual changes to the energy system we have today, namely by
replacing existing (and, usually, older) fossil-fueled power
plants with renewable facilities and, in some cases, nuclear
power. They assume steady-state or gradual changes in the
climate as the energy system decarbonizes.
They therefore predict that hydropower will provide a
meaningful amount of energy into the future and that other
renewable resources will replace fossil resources only. They
rarely envision scenarios in which both fossil and hydroelectric facilities are taken offline early. Similarly, most of
the models project that the energy transition will require a
substantial expansion of the existing transmission system,
but they do not model the costs of rebuilding transmission
lines that get destroyed by fires or of burying the existing
lines to avoid such fires in the first place. Finally, while the
models show that deep decarbonization through relatively
modest changes is achievable, they fail to address how and
whether a decarbonized energy system can be designed to
minimize, or at least not exacerbate, harms to humans and
the environment that our energy system has caused.
This omission of ecological welfare from energy system
decarbonization planning creates the risk that our gradual
efforts to mitigate climate change will hasten the demise
of species and communities we are ostensibly trying to
save from the ravages of climate change. Models that aim
to maintain the current hydropower system illustrate this
dynamic. Although hydropower can provide abundant
amounts of emissions-free electricity (assuming water supplies are sufficient and the reservoirs do not release methane created through anaerobic decomposition of organic
matter53), dams have exacted an enormous toll on the environment—including on species that are at greatest risk of
extinction due to climate change.
The famed Federal Columbia River Power System,
which supplies a substantial amount of electricity in
the Pacific Northwest (and in California), has so altered
stream flows and warmed waters in Idaho, Oregon, and
Washington that almost all the species of salmon in the
Columbia Basin are listed as endangered or threatened
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).54 Declining
salmon populations are also linked to the imperiled status of Pacific orca whales,55 which feed on the anadromous
53. Bobby Magill, Hydropower May Be Huge Source of Methane Emissions,
Climate Cent. (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.climatecentral.org/news/
hydropower-as-major-methane-emitter-18246.
54. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544, ELR Stat. ESA §§2-18; see also Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, Threatened, Endangered, and Candidate Fish
and Wildlife Species, https://www.dfw.state.or.us/wildlife/diversity/species/
threatened_endangered_candidate_list.asp (last revised July 2021).
55. Gene Johnson, Study: Chinook Salmon Are Key to Northwest Orcas All
Year, Or. Pub. Broadcasting (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.opb.org/ar-
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fish. Declining stocks of salmon have also caused profound
harm to Native American tribes, who for “time immemorial” have harvested salmon and called the wild Columbia
River their home.56
None of this information, of course, is new. But the consequences of the dams on the species and people of the
Pacific Northwest have been amplified by climate change,
and they will only worsen as temperatures continue to rise.
However, the models that assume that those dams will
remain in place and supply power in a decarbonized energy
system rarely discuss these risks. In an effort to show that
decarbonization can be facilitated through “least-cost”
hydropower systems, they fail to consider all of the other
costs of climate change we are aiming to avoid.
Even worse, there is a good chance that the energy
models’ projections of hydropower output are wrong. The
decarbonization studies all acknowledge that future hydropower production is uncertain, and that existing decarbonization models cannot precisely or accurately predict
how hydroelectric facilities will function in an increasingly
variable climate. Nonetheless, the models assume that
existing hydropower facilities will provide necessary power
well into the future. But if the models are wrong, then we
will seek to decarbonize via “least-cost” strategies, sacrificing endangered species and tribal rights, for no good.
So long as the models assume the hydropower system will
function more or less as it does now, those sacrifices seem,
tragically, inevitable.
But what if modelers were charged instead with modeling a decarbonized energy system for a 4°C world? In
that world, large hydropower projects would almost certainly play a much smaller role—if any role at all—since
their ability to provide electricity in drought-affected and
flood-impacted areas would be highly uncertain. The
hydropower capacity in today’s decarbonization models
would be replaced with other zero-emitting resources in
the energy system designed for a 4°C future, and, ideally,
the dams would be removed and free-flowing waters would
be restored.
Of course, if we wait for 4°C to be locked in, the salmon,
the orca, and a host of other species will be gone, and the
tribes will suffer even more. So, let’s not wait. Instead, let’s
jettison narrow “least-cost” approaches to energy decarbonization that ignore the massive costs our current energy
system already imposes on habitats, species, and humans.
While trade offs are inevitable and there are likely no ways
to decarbonize that do not exact some toll on humans and
the environment, we can at least aim to eliminate the most
destructive facilities. Let’s start planning for a decarbonized electricity system that can operate in a 4°C world so
that species and people have a chance in a 2°C one.

ticle/2021/03/04/study-chinook-salmon-are-key-to-northwest-orcas-allyear/.
56. Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, Tribal Salmon Culture,
https://critfc.org/salmon-culture/tribal-salmon-culture/ (last visited Jan. 6,
2022).
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III. Compensation at 4°C
This section was authored by Josh Galperin, Assistant Professor
of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University.
Governments, and therefore taxpayers, could be saddled
with enormous costs as global temperatures increase over
the coming years. One aspect of these costs is the compensation governments in the United States must pay property
owners if governments use eminent domain to acquire private property to modernize infrastructure to accommodate
huge shifts in population density. Some obscure aspects of
Compensation Clause doctrine might provide a road map
for minimizing these costs.
A ProPublica report from 2020 explains that there is
an ideal human climate niche—an area with water, temperatures, and other climatic factors that make the area livable and productive.57 In the United States today, the ideal
niche covers most of the eastern seaboard from southern
New England to middle Georgia and stretches westward
to about the western border of the Dakotas, Nebraska,
and Oklahoma.58 As the world warms, that niche will shift
northward. At 4°C warming, places like the Great Lakes
region and the central and northern Appalachians will be
among the only places left in the United States for significant human populations to persist.59
When this shift happens, there will be massive population shifts with people migrating from “sending zones”
like the coasts, the Southwest, and Southeast to “receiving zones” like the Great Lakes region.60 With population
increases of possibly 200,000,000 people in the receiving zones,61 governments will have to play a massive role
to avoid chaos, preparing receiving-zone infrastructure to
support transportation, housing, water management, and
other necessities for dense, growing populations. The problem is that the U.S. Constitution can make this difficult.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
governments “eminent domain” authority to take property from private owners so long as the government puts
it to public use.62 The takings power will be essential as
governments acquire property for things like roads, reservoirs, treatment plants, mass transit, schools, police stations, military bases, shelters, cooling stations, and much
more. Most of this infrastructure already exists, but dramatically shifting populations will require new concentrations of, and updates to, infrastructure in receiving zones.

57. Al Shaw et al., New Climate Maps Show a Transformed United States,
ProPublica (Sept. 15, 2020), https://projects.propublica.org/
climate-migration/.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Abrahm Lustgarten, Climate Change Will Force a New American Migration, ProPublica (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/
climate-change-will-force-a-new-american-migration/.
61. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau United States Population Growth by Region, https://www.census.gov/popclock/print.php?
component=growth&image=//www.census.gov/popclock/share/images/
growth_1561939200.png (last visited Jan. 6, 2022). This estimate includes
roughly the populations of the coasts, Southeast, and Southwest.
62. U.S. Const. amend. V.
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Fortunately, at least as an initial matter, the Constitution’s Takings Clause makes this massive infrastructure
program possible because these uses clearly serve a public
purpose apparent even to those who refuse to understand
climate change.
Of course, the Compensation Clause requires governments to pay for any property they acquire through eminent domain.63 In that way, it makes sense to think of
government takings as a forced sale of property. The government must pay the former owner fair market value for
taken property. The U.S. Supreme Court has taken the
Compensation Clause further, and said that even if governments do not take ownership of property, they must
still pay compensation if a regulation imposes a sufficient
burden on the property.64
Therefore, whether a government intentionally takes
ownership of property or designs regulations to address
climate migrations, there will be a cost to this land-acquisition authority. This is particularly true considering that
receiving zones will be among the only places where people
can survive under a 4°C warming scenario and there will,
therefore, be huge demand for property in these areas,
pushing up values and the costs of government compensation. How will the government afford to compensate property owners in a 4°C world, where the need for government
intervention will be so stark?
There are two ways to approach this question. First, governments can capitalize on mass population shifts to raise
money that will pay for compensation. With respect to this
fundraising question, traditional strategies like raising tax
revenue seem plausible, but the volatility of a 4°C economy
might make the tax strategy difficult. Another option is
to leverage newly available property in sending zones.65 If
people are fleeing Florida because of flooding, Los Angeles because of drought, and Louisiana because of heat and
humidity, governments may be able to obtain property in
those areas at very low cost. The ability of a government to
add value by taking and then consolidating land in sending
zones might make the properties more attractive to speculators who are unwilling to take the risk of parcel-by-parcel
acquisition but see value in consolidated tracts.
Second, governments can minimize the costs of compensation while remaining within constitutional bounds.
This is a “doctrinal” strategy for reducing the costs of
takings in the receiving zones. Courts measure just compensation by the fair market value of a property. Experts
estimate what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller,
and that is the amount the government pays the former
owner. Although the calculation is not always simple, in
practice the principle is at least easy to understand.

Things get more complicated when we are dealing with
a “partial taking,”66 which occurs when the government
does not acquire an entire property, but only part of it,
leaving the owner with a “remainder.” For example, to
enlarge a road, a government might take 10 feet of property from 25 homeowners, leaving those homeowners with
most of their property remaining in their possession. The
government, of course, must pay for the slice of the lot
it has taken, but factoring in the remainder property can
change the calculation.
Suppose a government project, like the road widening,
provides a financial benefit to the remainder property. The
Supreme Court has written that “just compensation” must
be just to both the person from whom the property was
taken and to the public.67 In other words, while the government must pay, it must not overpay. If a government
project creates a measurable benefit to remainder property,
and the compensation does not account for that benefit,
then the landowner may get a windfall from both the
direct payment and an increase in the remainder property’s
value. This is unjust for the public, which ultimately pays
the compensation through tax dollars.
Over the years, the Court has developed a test for
deciding what sort of benefits it will offset from compensation and what sort of benefits will leave the compensation unchanged. Broadly speaking, the Court allows
“special benefits” to be subtracted from compensation,
but it does not allow subtraction of “general benefits.”68
The way the Court has defined these terms is a jumbled
mess, and certain doctrinal tweaks may be necessary to
make the most sense of this area of law, particularly in
light of the need for government intervention at 4°C.69
But the important concept is that certain types of government infrastructure and planning projects will generate enough clear and calculable financial benefit to
remainder properties that the government will not have
to offer any additional cash compensation.
This offsetting suggests a possible strategy for compensation at 4°C. When a government acquires property in
climate receiving zones in order to make those zones inhabitable for vastly larger populations, the government should
consider two things. First, governments should make
efforts not to take entire properties. Leaving a remainder
property creates a potential for reducing costs by generating benefits to the remainder.
Second, governments should thoughtfully, carefully,
and explicitly identify financial benefits to the remainder so
that courts can easily understand the way a project provides
in-kind compensation that can offset cash payments. There
is little question that drinkable water, efficient transporta-

63. Id.
64. E.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
65. Renee Cho, How Climate Change Impacts the Economy, St. Planet
(June 20, 2019), https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2019/06/20/
climate-change-economy-impacts/.

66. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Partial Takings, 117 Colum. L.
Rev. 2043 (2017).
67. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
68. Brittany Harrison, The Compensation Conundrum in Partial Takings Cases
and the Consequences of Borough of Harvey Cedars, 2015 Cardozo L. Rev.
De Novo 31 (2015).
69. Joshua Ulan Galperin, Raisins and Resilience: Elaborating Horne’s Compensation Analysis With an Eye to Coastal Climate Change Adaptation, 35 Stan.
Env’t L.J. 3 (2016).
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tion, public safety services, and reliable electricity provide
significant benefits to property owners who rely on them.
When properly structured, 4°C infrastructure projects can
use these significant benefits to reduce the cost, keeping the
United States functioning in the warming world.

Profs. J.B. Ruhl and Robin Kundis Craig paint a vision of a
4°C world marked by “discontinuous and often unpredictable transformation.”70 Nature, from climate to ecosystems
to species, is hard to predict in the best of times. It’s a wild
beast in a 4°C world. This means that we will have to give
up our efforts to tightly control nature and instead give her
room. Room in a real, physical sense, like space for species
to migrate71 and for seas to rise72 and for rivers to roam73;
and room in a metaphorical sense, by not harvesting and
managing and controlling and consuming right up to (and
even beyond) the edge of destruction.74
The only certain thing in this uncertain 4°C future is
change: The weather in many locations will be marked by
increased variability, higher temperatures, more extreme
precipitation events, and changes in total precipitation.
Sea levels will rise. Storms will be more intense. In short,
climate change will make many of our current climate
expectations obsolete. Moreover, a 4°C world does not
just present a new set of stable conditions that society can
assume will continue into the future; continuing unpredictable shifts in climate are a hallmark of a 4°C world.75
This is especially challenging because core aspects of
our society, from infrastructure to farming to insurance to
conservation, have been designed with the assumption of
relatively predictable climate. Infrastructure, for example,
is often tailored very narrowly to meet a predicted climate
range; flood insurance programs require levee protection
designed to withstand a 100-year flood event in most areas.
But in a 4°C world, levees will face storms that exceed
those design standards much more frequently than once
every 100 years.76
We’ve left ourselves a narrow margin of safety in all
kinds of systems, from infrastructure to agriculture to
environmental protection.77 This approach leaves little

room for error, and the predictable climate that enabled
this approach is ending. We’re moving into a climate that
is predictably unpredictable. Our current world of just-intime delivery, thin margins, efficiency, precise timing, and
long supply chains is not built for the uncertainties of a 4°C
future.78 This problem extends to the ways we currently
manage ecosystems, using approaches that leave little room
for nature itself.
Prof. Dave Owen describes the prevailing ecosystem
management ethos as “allow[ing] resource consumption right up to perceived brinks of illegality and . . .
provid[ing] just enough protection to avoid legal violations, but no more.”79 Managing at the brink of illegality
is part of a broader problem of trying to manage natural
systems within carefully delineated boundaries, under
tight control. Of course, we actively manage ecosystems
to protect particular species or provide particular ecosystem goods and services. But in many cases, as Professor
Owen describes, we try to do so with too little room for
error, giving ecosystems only enough to deliver what we
seek. Examples include just-in-time delivery of habitat for
migrating birds,80 the deployment of just-in-time water
management for fish protection,81 the provision of just
enough protection for species to avoid a jeopardy opinion
under the ESA,82 and limitations on protections for desirable species to small habitat areas on the assumption that
managers can unfailingly provide the precise conditions
the species require.83
The inclination toward these approaches is entirely
understandable. They present the irresistible promise of
using science, technology, and engineering in real time to
meet the needs of nature while putting as few constraints
on human activities as possible. Who doesn’t want more
with less? In so many ways, it fits with our cultural zeitgeist. Even under current conditions, though, this approach
often falls apart in the face of uncertainty and the inherent
challenges of predicting natural system responses.84 And
when these kinds of efforts fail, they generally place the
burden of failure on ecosystems and species; they are not
safe-to-fail approaches.
In an uncertain 4°C world, tight management to
achieve a narrow range of ecosystem conditions will be
both increasingly expensive and increasingly impossible.
The nature or character of an ecosystem is determined
based on physical characteristics of the ecosystem, like pre-

70. Ruhl & Craig, supra note 2, at 217.
71. Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural
Resource Law Under Climate Change, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 171 (2010).
72. Miyuki Hino et al., Managed Retreat as a Response to Natural Hazard Risk, 7
Nature Climate Change 364 (2017).
73. Sigrun Rohde et al., Room for Rivers: An Integrative Search Strategy for Floodplain Restoration, 78 Landscape & Urb. Plan. 50 (2006).
74. Johan Rockström et al., A Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 461 Nature
472 (2009).
75. See Melinda Morgan & Robin Kundis Craig, The End of Sustainability, 27
Soc’y & Nat. Res. 777 (2014).
76. See Nigel W. Arnell et al., Global and Regional Impacts of Climate Change at
Different Levels of Global Temperature Increase, 155 Climate Change 377,
384 (2019).
77. See Rockström et al., supra note 74, at 472-73.

78. Merve Er Kara et al., Modelling the Impact of Climate Change Risk on Supply
Chain Performance, 59 Int’l J. Prod. Rsch. 7317 (2021).
79. Dave Owens, Law, Environmental Dynamism, Reliability: The Rise and Fall
of CALFED, 37 Env’t L. 1145, 1147 (2008).
80. See, e.g., Jim Robbins, Paying Farmers to Welcome Birds, N.Y. Times (Apr.
14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/15/science/paying-farmersto-welcome-birds.html.
81. See, e.g., Karrigan Börk et al., Small Populations in Jeopardy: A Delta Smelt
Case Study, 50 ELR 10714, 10717 (Sept. 2020).
82. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies’ Duty to
Conserve Species, 25 Env’t L. 1107, 1109-10 (1995).
83. See, e.g., Karrigan Börk, Governing Nature: Bambi Law in a WALL-E World,
62 B.C. L. Rev. 155, 214, 228, 230 (2021).
84. See Börk et al., supra note 81, at 10722.

IV. Room for Nature
This section was authored by Karrigan Börk, Acting Professor
of Law, University of California, Davis School of Law.
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cipitation, soil characteristics, and temperatures, and on
species availability (what gets introduced to the ecosystem)
and the interactions between the species that find their way
into the ecosystem. Changing any of those aspects of an
ecosystem can produce a cascade of changes throughout
the whole of the ecosystem, altering ecosystem aspects such
as the abundance and kinds of species present as well as
physical conditions in the ecosystem.
Climate change is already producing widespread
changes in ecosystem conditions.85 Predicting exactly how
a particular ecosystem will react to these changes is very
difficult, but scientists can nevertheless predict that change
is very likely. For example, based on increasing temperatures alone, more than one in every three local species in
the Americas will be different in 90 years.86 The ecosystems
that will develop in a 4°C world are unpredictable, with no
analog in today’s ecosystems, and tightly managing those
ecosystems to provide desired outcomes will be tremendously, well, uncertain.87
Instead, managers must approach ecosystem management with humility, not an expectation of understanding
and control.88 What, precisely, does managing with humility mean? I’m excited to flesh that out in future work, but
as a baseline, humility counsels leaving time and space for
nature.89 Physical space: Space for new wetlands. Space for
rising seas. Space for shifting floodplains. Space for fire.
Space for new species. Space and time for natural processes
to develop and shift and adapt.90 And metaphorical space:
relaxed expectations about our ability to control nature
and predict the outcome of management actions, more
conservative estimates of how species will respond to conservation efforts, more leeway in estimating water needs for
nature, less belief in the power of science and engineering
to replicate natural systems, and more space to fail without
irreparable and unacceptable consequences.91
In some ways, leaving space for nature fits well with our
4°C infrastructure challenges. “Reconciliation ecology,”92
defined by its originator Michael L. Rosenzweig as “the
85. Brett R. Scheffers et al., The Broad Footprint of Climate Change From Genes
to Biomes to People, 354 Science 719, 719 (2016).
86. See Joshua J. Lawler et al., Projected Climate-Induced Faunal Change in the
Western Hemisphere, 90 Ecology 588, 591-92 (2009).
87. See John W. Williams & Stephen T. Jackson, Novel Climates, No-Analog
Communities, and Ecological Surprises, 5 Frontiers Ecology & Env’t 475,
475 (2007).
88. See John Copeland Nagle, Humility and Environmental Law, 10 Liberty U.
L. Rev. 335, 354-55 (2016).
89. Börk, supra note 83, at 229.
90. See Nature Conservancy Conservation Gateway, Conserving Nature’s
Stage, https://www.conservationgateway.org/ConservationByGeography/
NorthAmerica/UnitedStates/edc/reportsdata/climate/stage/Pages/default.
aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
91. See, e.g., Paul Stanton Kibel, Of Hatcheries and Habitat: Old and New
Conservation Assumptions in the Pacific Salmon Treaty, 10 Wash. J. Env’t
L. & Pol’y 90, 92-93 (2020) (analyzing the faulty assumption that an
increase in salmon volumes released from hatcheries will result in higher
abundance forecasts).
92. See Ecologist Urges Sharing Land With Other Species to Foster Biodiversity,
Johns Hopkins (Mar. 22, 2004), https://publichealth.jhu.edu/2004/
reconciliation; see also Adrian Ayres Fisher, Ethics and Ecosystem Interactions: Why Reconciliation Ecology Matters, Resilience (Apr. 28, 2016),
https://www.resilience.org/stories/2016-04-28/ethics-and-ecosysteminteractions-why-reconciliation-ecology-matters/.
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science of inventing, establishing and maintaining new
habitats to conserve species diversity in places where people
live, work and play,”93 provides ways to integrate human
and natural system needs. Thus, to use one example, perhaps “leaving space for wetlands and floodplains” means
building seawalls and levees set far enough back from
coasts and rivers to provide both improved flood protection
and space for nature. Moreover, we must also consider how
to integrate the inevitable human migration with healthy
ecosystems: as people migrate to more hospitable places, we
must leave room for nature in the new developments. And,
although perhaps it is more restoration than reconciliation, as we manage our retreat from places made unlivable
by climate change, we must not salt the earth, but rather
rewild the lands and waters we leave behind.
Some states have begun to embrace this approach in
their climate adaptation plans. California, for example,
lists “prioritize natural infrastructure solutions” as one of
its seven overarching principles for climate change adaptation and highlights the importance of restoration and conservation of natural systems to successful adaptation.94 This
is a good start. But more broadly, we must recognize that
tight controls of all kinds will fail in a 4°C future, that the
ecosystems of the future will not be the ecosystems of the
present, and that nature needs space if it is to continue supporting life in the ways we have come to expect.

V.

In a 4°C World, the Inexorable
Climate Change-Biodiversity Nexus

This section was authored by David Takacs, Professor of Law,
University of California, Hastings Law School. Thanks to
Donato Catrina, University of California, Hastings Law
School Class of 2023, for excellent research assistance.
A 4°C world will reshape the human and nonhuman landscapes of the planet. That’s axiomatic. This reshaping,
which we could have avoided, will now unfurl beyond our
control: seas will inundate, storms will destroy, droughts
will parch. But within our control is how we reshape the
landscapes in response as we abandon, tear down, migrate,
resettle, rebuild, mitigate, adapt.
The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) report,95 other essays in this Article, and Robin
Kundis Craig and J.B. Ruhl’s prescient, unhappinessinducing article96 lay out the consequences of a 4°C rise.
The latest report by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)
(the IPCC’s more obscure cousin) predicts that more than
one million species are imminently threatened with extinc93. Michael L. Rosenzweig, Win-Win Ecology: How the Earth’s Species
Can Survive in the Midst of Human Enterprise 7 (2003).
94. California Natural Resources Agency, Safeguarding California
Plan: 2018 Update 27 (2018).
95. IPCC, Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Working
Group I Contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC
(Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2021), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/
ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_Full_Report.pdf.
96. Ruhl & Craig, supra note 2.
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tion.97 Those in the know increasingly warn that climate
change exacerbates already dire human threats to biodiversity, rendering protected biodiversity redoubts no longer
habitable but leaving no places to which to migrate.
As we needlessly hurl ourselves into the 4°C future, and
as we gobble ever more of earth’s resources, climate change
and biodiversity portend intertwined, grave threats. Nonetheless, we think of these crises (when we think of them at
all) in separate buckets: you over there, think about and
tackle GHG buildup and responses; and over here, we’ll
think about biodiversity loss.
It’s time to multitask, to simultaneously envision how
conserving biodiversity helps us mitigate and adapt to
GHG buildup, and how mitigating and adapting to climate change can and must promote biodiversity. Both
because these grave threats are braided and can and should
be addressed symbiotically, and for practical reasons—
we only have so much time and money to invest to arrest
these cataclysms and sustain a livable planet—we should
be merging our approaches to climate change mitigation
and adaptation, and biodiversity depletion. Think of it as
biodiversity “mitadaptation.” Biodiversity helps us mitigate
GHG buildup; biodiversity helps us adapt to changing ecological regimes; efforts to mitigate GHG accumulation can
help or harm biodiversity; and efforts to adapt to climate
change can help or harm biodiversity. In a 4°C future, we
must pay a lot more attention to the inexorably linked climate-biodiversity mitadaptation nexus.
Jurisdictions’ pledges to achieve the Convention on Biological Diversity’s ambitious goal of 30% of land protected
by 203098 could be synergistic if planners thought: How do
our plans to reach 30 x 30 produce co-benefits if we think
of biodiversity as mitadaptation? How could our nascent
plans for nature-based solutions to mitadaptation improve
outcomes for biodiversity by specifically incorporating and
putting biodiversity’s needs at the center? Because many
biodiversity mitadaptation decisions are project-based, we
need not wait for international or national agreements to
think holistically and synergistically. Consider the following serving suggestions.
Rebecca R. Hernandez et al. describe “techno-ecological synergies” when devising solar energy systems.99 In
response to mandates to reduce GHGs, large-scale solar
energy developers produce unintended consequences100
by scarfing down water and destroying biodiversity.101

97. Media Release, IPBES, Nature’s Dangerous Decline “Unprecedented”; Species Extinction Rates “Accelerating,” https://ipbes.net/news/
Media-Release-Global-Assessment.
98. Convention on Biological Diversity, Zero Draft of the Post-2020 Global
Biodiversity Framework, CBD/WG2020/2/3 (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.
cbd.int/doc/c/efb0/1f84/a892b98d2982a829962b6371/wg2020-02-03en.pdf.
99. Rebecca R. Hernandez et al., Techno-Ecological Synergies of Solar Energy for
Global Sustainability, 2 Nature Sustainability 560 (2019).
100. David Takacs, Protecting Your Environment, Exacerbating Injustice: Avoiding
“Mandate Havens,” 24 Duke Env’t L. & Pol’y F. 315 (2014).
101. Katherine Harmon Courage, Solar Farms Are Often Bad for Biodiversity—But They Don’t Have to Be, Vox (Aug. 18, 2021), https://www.vox.
com/2021/8/18/22556193/solar-energy-biodiversity-birds-pollinatorland; Kiera Butler, Big Solar’s Death Panels, Mother Jones (Mar./Apr.
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By carefully planning where and how to develop solar,
and by mitigating the ecological degradation that solar
development (currently pegged at nearly one-half the U.S.
energy supply by 2050102) causes, developers may minimize damage to biodiversity. To account for demand for
ecosystem services to support the solar energy development, the community-owned Westmill Solar Park in the
United Kingdom103 managed and achieved some biodiversity benefits (e.g., they planted native grasses and created
pollinator habitat) that simultaneously increase transpiration under the panels, thus cooling them and generating
energy more efficiently.104
Building artificial, biodiversity-enhancing coral reefs
may protect low-lying coastal areas from storms and flooding.105 In cooler climes, the Netherlands has long battled
threatening seas, and is now leading the world in learning to live with rising seas by using a “build with nature”
philosophy.106 The “sand motor” off the coast of the Netherlands provides a model of techno-ecological adaptation
to climate change that simultaneously explicitly attends to
biodiversity. In this pilot project, the Dutch harvested sand
offshore (perhaps itself not a sustainable model) to build its
buffer island. The goals of the project explicitly include creation of new habitat for flora and fauna, and at its 10-year
anniversary, researchers found a rich diversity of shellfish
and snails, providing food for shorebirds.107
Forests are the savior of GHG reduction goals, with netzero or carbon-neutral targets depending on “offsetting”
the carbon externalities of development; trees are repurposed as carbon sequestration devices. But win-win-win
programs under the aegis of REDD+ usually do not pay
sufficient or any attention to biodiversity co-benefits.108
Ninety-two percent of plantation expansion in the tropics
between 2000-2012 occurred in biodiversity hot spots,109
sometimes fueled by carbon offset funds, but seldom with
biodiversity/climate change mitadaptation in mind.
2011), https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2011/02/solar-panelsdesert-tortoise-mojave/.
102. Ivan Penn, From 4% to 45%: Energy Department Lays Out Ambitious Blueprint for Solar Power, N.Y. Times (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/09/08/business/energy-environment/biden-solar-energy-climate-change.html.
103. Westmill Solar Co-operative Ltd., Wider Work, http://westmillsolar.coop/
wider-work/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
104. Alona Armstrong et al., Solar Park Microclimate and Vegetation Management Effects on Grassland Carbon Cycling, 11 Env’t Res. Letters 074106 (2016), available at https://iopscience.iop.org/
article/10.1088/1748-9326/11/7/074016/pdf.
105. United Nations Climate Technology Centre & Network, Artificial Reefs,
https://www.ctc-n.org/technologies/artificial-reefs (last visited Jan. 6,
2022).
106. Climate-ADAPT, Sand Motor—Build With Nature Solution to Improve
Coastal Protection Along Delfland Coast (the Netherlands), https://climateadapt.eea.europa.eu/metadata/case-studies/sand-motor-2013-buildingwith-nature-solution-to-improve-coastal-protection-along-delfland-coastthe-netherlands (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
107. Netherlands Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management,
The Sand Motor (2021), https://dezandmotor.nl/app/uploads/2021/06/
Publiekssamenvatting-Zandmotor_ENG_digi.pdf.
108. David Takacs, Forest Carbon Projects and International Law: A Deep Equity
Analysis, 22 Geo. Int’l L. Rev. 521 (2010).
109. Matthew Fagan et al., The Expansion of Tree Plantations Across Tropical Biomes, Nature Portfolio (June 22, 2021), https://www.researchsquare.
com/article/rs-604751/v1.
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When foresters restore land degraded by industrial logging or destroyed by fires, they usually emphasize rapidly
growing monocultures, and employ biocides to battle
“weeds.” That is, they prioritize short-term economic rather
than ecological value. To quote one article, foresters can’t
see the forest for the plantations.110 The U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) considers it111 progressive evolution
to plant trees uphill 500 feet from where a species has traditionally grown—a few steps uphill in the right direction,
but not one that creatively imagines what a biodiversityrich forest will comprise in a 4°C world.
In one British Columbia reforesting project, Seed
the North112 is “[f]ighting climate change, one sprout at
a time.” They harvest seeds from land neighboring disturbed areas, and employ indigenous people (and not just
their knowledge) to harvest and cultivate the seeds. They
then use drones to drop diverse, biochar-encased seeds
of native species over remote areas. They aim to create
vast carbon sinks composed of native species that sustain
greater biodiversity and are more able to adapt to changing climate conditions.113
Biodiversity itself may mitigate GHG accumulation.
Oswald J. Schmitz et al. show that animals regulate carbon
exchange between the atmosphere and ecosystems in major,
not always well-understood ways.114 Predator/herbivoreprey/carbon relationships are complicated. For example,
wolves in boreal ecosystems control moose populations,
which, through altered grazing intensity, increases carbon
retention in plants; on the other hand, wolves that prey on
elk in prairie ecosystems end up releasing more carbon into
the atmosphere. Living whales store tons of carbon, and
their excrement nourishes carbon-sucking phytoplankton.
When whales die and sink to the bottom of the ocean, they
take their stored carbon with them.115 Forest elephants in
Central Africa browse smaller trees, alleviating competition and allowing surviving trees to grow larger; researchers estimate that loss of elephants has decreased carbon
stocks by 7% in their forest ecosystems.116

110. Gianluca Cerullo, Should Tree Plantations Count Toward Reforestation Goals? It’s Complicated, Mongabay (Sept. 10, 2021), https://
news.mongabay.com/2021/09/should-tree-plantations-count-towardreforestation-goals-its-complicated/.
111. Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA, Creating More Resilient Forests Through Active Management (2018), https://www.fs.fed.
us/psw/topics/tree_mortality/california/documents/EcoManagementReport.pdf.
112. Seed the North, Approach, https://seedthenorth.ca/approach/ (last visited
Jan. 6, 2022).
113. Amanda Follett Hosgood, Seed the North: Fighting Climate Change,
One Sprout at a Time, Grist (May 22, 2021), https://grist.org/science/
seed-the-north-fighting-climate-change-one-sprout-at-a-time.
114. Oswald J. Schmitz et al., Animals and the Zoogeochemistry of the Carbon Cycle, 362 Science eaar3213 (2018), https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/
science.aar3213.
115. Michelle Carrere, To Fight Climate Change, Save the Whales, Some Scientists
Say, Mongabay (Mar. 1, 2021), https://news.mongabay.com/2021/03/tofight-climate-change-save-the-whales-some-scientists-say/; Sophie Yeo, How
Whales Help Cool the Earth, BBC (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/
future/article/20210119-why-saving-whales-can-help-fight-climate-change.
116. Fabio Berzaghi et al., Carbon Stocks in Central African Forests Enhanced by
Elephant Disturbance, 12 Nature Geoscience 725 (2019), available at
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41561-019-0395-6.
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We have no time not to think about biodiversity as we
mitadapt, and no time not to think about mitadaptation
when we effect biodiversity conservation. Nature-based
solutions are also predicated on the notion that attending to functioning ecological communities makes human
communities function better as well. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, it not only makes practical and economic sense to promote biodiversity when implementing
climate change mitigation and adaptation goals, and vice
versa. If we are to survive this period of rapid ecological
transition, we require a cultural paradigm shift117 where
we see ourselves as fundamentally interconnected with the
natural world. The mitadaptation examples above sample
ways that our actions, policies, and laws could evolve to
reflect and reinforce synergistic, holistic, systems-thinking imaginings.

VI. America Erased
This section was authored by Michele Okoh, Senior Lecturing
Fellow, Environmental Law and Policy Clinic, Duke
Law School.
Drought. Flooding. Extreme heat. Climate change has
many tools for destruction, but no matter the disaster, in
a 4°C world, parts of the United States will be left uninhabitable.118 Significant portions of the population will be
forced to leave their homes due to climate disasters and
will live their lives as internally displaced people.119 These
people will bring with them diverse cultural identities.
They will also have left places of significant cultural and
historical relevance.120 The locations may be lost, but the
people will endure.
If the United States is to protect culture in the face of
climate change, it must shift its focus toward protecting
the culture that resides within those people.121 However,
much of the current approach to protecting culture and
history is rooted in protecting places. The paragon of this
approach is the National Historic Preservation Act. Places
deemed worthy of preservation are listed on the National
Register of Historic Places, which has historically not been
racially and gender inclusive, thereby failing to reflect the
United States’ diversity.122 Places that have been recently
added to address this lack of diversity are especially vulnerable to climate change.123
117. David Takacs, We Are the River, 2021 U. Ill. L. Rev. 545 (2021).
118. Ruhl & Craig, supra note 2.
119. See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Report on
Internal Displacement (2021), https://www.internal-displacement.org/
global-report/grid2021/downloads/IDMC_GRID21_Final_HQ.pdf?v=2.
120. See David G. Anderson et al., Sea-Level Rise and Archaeological Site Destruction: An Example From the Southeastern United States Using DINAA (Digital
Index of North American Archaeology), 12 PLoS One e0188142 (2017); Abby
Neal, Cultural Heritage Is a Necessary Component of Climate Solutions, Env’t
& Energy Study Inst. (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/
cultural-heritage-is-a-necessary-component-of-climate-solutions.
121. See W. Neil Adger et al., Cultural Dimensions of Climate Change Impacts and
Adaptation, 3 Nature Climate Change 112 (2013), https://www.nature.
com/articles/nclimate1666.
122. Neal, supra note 120.
123. Id.
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Executive Order No. 13146 is an example of historic
preservation beyond the National Historic Preservation
Act. In the wake of Hurricane Floyd’s devastation of
Princeville, North Carolina, President William Clinton
issued Order No. 13146 to recognize the historical significance of Princeville as the first city founded in the United
States by freed slaves and to create the President’s Council
on the Future of Princeville, North Carolina.124 However,
memory is ephemeral, and until recently, the National
Museum of African American History and Culture recognized Eatonville, Florida, as the first town chartered by
Black Americans.125 This error has since been corrected,
and Princeville’s pride in being the first town chartered by
Black Americans endures.126 Despite this previous inaccuracy, residents of Princeville are aware of their cultural
significance and the value their community holds in American history.127
Many residents of Princeville were relocated following
Hurricane Floyd, but the town was rebuilt.128 Eventually,
Princeville’s population returned to its levels prior to Hurricane Floyd.129 The town of Princeville had the option of
a buyout, but ultimately, the town rejected the buyout.130
Princeville instead opted to rebuild its levees to protect it
from the 100-year floodplain.131
Unfortunately, the 100-year flood came 83 years early
with Hurricane Matthew in 2016.132 Again, the town was
flooded, destroying 450 homes.133 The population was only
2,200 at the time of Hurricane Matthew.134 The road to
recovery has been long, with many residents not wanting to abandon the historical significance of Princeville.135
Following Hurricane Matthew, North Carolina provided
funding to purchase a total of 141 acres of neighboring
land to relocate the most threatened parts of the town.136
However, in a 4°C world, partial retreat will be insufficient.137 The places communities value most will be lost.
Princeville is an example of cultural and historical resilience. When their history was forgotten by other Americans, the people of Princeville remembered who they were
as a community. The attachment to place will endure, but
in the face of destruction, governments can choose to invest
not just in protecting places, but also in the people who
take pride in that culture and history. However, memory
124. Exec. Order No. 13146, 65 Fed. Reg. 12318 (Mar. 8, 2000).
125. Cynthia A. Grace-McCaskey et al., Finding Voices in the Floods of Freedom
Hill: Innovating Solutions in Princeville, North Carolina, 11 J. Env’t Stud.
& Sci. 341 (2021), available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/
s13412-021-00701-5.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Coastal Resilience Center, Hurricane Matthew Recovery—Princeville,
https://coastalresiliencecenter.unc.edu/crc-projects/hurricane-matthewrecovery/hurricane-matthew-recovery-engagement/hurricane-matthewrecovery-princeville/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
134. Id.
135. Grace-McCaskey et al., supra note 125.
136. Id. at 348.
137. Ruhl & Craig, supra note 2.
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is ephemeral, and geography is a part of community identity.138 Once communities are dispersed, the United States
risks losing that community identity and consequently the
history and culture associated with that community.
Place is an important and complex aspect of individual
and collective identity, but it is not the only source of identity. Geographic communities are just one type of community, just one classification existing among a multitude
of identities.139 Culture and history can be protected if a
cultural/historical perspective is taken toward communities. The geography may be lost, but the community will
remain if protected. To protect this culture and history,
the United States can choose to take an anticipatory or
reactive approach to adaptation. The current approach is
largely reactive, but an anticipatory approach is necessary
to protect these resources against the advancing threat of
climate change.140
Documents can be preserved. Oral histories can be
recorded. But land, places that are slated to become uninhabitable in a 4°C world, cannot be saved from climate
change. What will happen if America chooses to continue
emphasizing place in its approach to protecting and preserving history and culture? If people lose both their geographic community and the proximity geography provides
to one’s social community, what culture and history will be
lost? Will America take the anticipatory approach to preserving the culture and history existing within these communities? Or will America simply be erased?

VII. The Mutable Boundaries of a
Worst-Case Climate World
This section was authored by Cinnamon P. Carlarne,
Associate Dean for Faculty and Intellectual Life and Alumni
Society Designated Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law,
The Ohio State University.
Climate change disrupts the boundaries that demarcate
human existence.
Boundaries are an essential tool in contemporary human
life. They produce and entrench identity. They ground governance systems. They determine who can come, who must
go, and what the terms for living among others will be.
Law codifies and fixes boundaries. It defines political141 and property142 boundaries, and even attempts to

138. Jianchao Peng et al., Place Identity: How Far Have We Come in Exploring Its
Meanings?, 11 Frontiers Psych. 294 (2020).
139. Travis B. Paveglio et al., Re-Conceptualizing Community in Risk Research, 20
J. Risk Rsch. 931 (2017), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1366987
7.2015.1121908.
140. Shiv Someshwar, Adaptation to Climate Change: Moving Beyond “Reactive”
Approaches, World Res. Inst., https://www.wri.org/our-work/project/
world-resources-report/adaptation-climate-change-moving-beyond-reactive-approaches (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
141. See, e.g., Jeffrey Herbst, The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa, 43 Int’l Orgs. 673 (1989).
142. See generally Keith Hirokawa, Three Stories About Nature: Property, the Environment, and Ecosystem Services, 62 Mercer L. Rev. 541 (2011).
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delineate the boundaries of ecological systems.143 These
boundaries, too often, are politically and environmentally arbitrary.144 They divide and reconstruct communities; they fragment ecosystems.
Questions of boundaries consume legal scholars—how
they are constructed, how they operate, how they evolve.
For environmental lawyers, these conversations frequently
advance ecologically oriented thinking145 and the benefits of recognizing functional, rather than geographical,
boundaries of ecological systems and ecosystem services.146 Increasingly, they also center consideration of planetary boundaries that “define the safe operating space for
humanity with respect to the earth system.”147
In a territorialized world where boundaries are the foundation of the rule of law, and indeed the body politic itself,
shifting boundaries are a conundrum. They pose existential challenges to systems of law that thrive on and, too
often, assume stability. Stasis is law’s comfort zone. Climate change shatters assumptions of stasis. It doesn’t just
force us to rethink boundaries; it moves the boundaries
right under our feet.
In a worst-case climate world,148 climate change will
redraw our maps, rewire our minds, and revolutionize our
politics. For the sake of simplicity in this short essay, we
can imagine key shifts along the axis of the physical, psychological, and the political.
First, the physical. Climate change is altering our landscapes. Globally, the tropics and the Sahara are expanding.149 In the United States, flood zones fluctuate, the
100th meridian line shifts east, and plant hardiness zones
push farther north.150 But it’s not just climate zones and
ecosystem boundaries that are changing. Glacial zone
retreat in the Alps blurs the border lines between Italy
and Switzerland.151 Equally, Arctic coastal states scramble
to expand their outer continental shelf boundaries as sea
ice disappears and new opportunities appear for territorial expansion.
Second, the psychological. As physical boundaries shift,
so too does our sense of place, stability, and identity. As
143. See, e.g., Geoffrey Garver, The Rule of Ecological Law: The Legal Complement
to Degrowth Economics, 5 Sustainability 316, 317-18 (2013).
144. See, e.g., Anastasia Telesetsky, Restoration and Large Marine Ecosystems:
Strengthening Governance for an Emerging International Regime Based on
“Ecoscape” Management, 35 U. Haw. L. Rev. 735, 762 (2013).
145. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale,
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 Va. Env’t L.J. 189, 190 (2002).
146. See, e.g., Keith Hirokawa, More Better Information as 4°C Preparedness: Ecosystem Benefit Flows and Community Engagement, Env’t L. Prof
Blog (Oct. 14, 2021), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2021/10/more-better-information-as-4c-preparedness-ecosystembenefit-flows-and-community-engagement.html.
147. See Rockström et al., supra note 74, at 472.
148. See Ruhl & Craig, supra note 2.
149. See Paul W. Staten et al., Re-Examining Tropical Expansion, 8 Nature Climate Change 768 (2018), available at https://www.nature.com/articles/
s41558-018-0246-2.
150. See, e.g., Nicola Jones, Redrawing the Map: How the World’s Climate Zones
Are Shifting, Yale Env’t 360 (Oct. 23, 2018), https://e360.yale.edu/
features/redrawing-the-map-how-the-worlds-climate-zones-are-shifting.
151. See, e.g., Douglas Broom, Climate Changes Risks Moving This Restaurant From Italy to Switzerland—Without Shifting a Brick, World
Econ. F. (May 20, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/05/
climate-change-restaurant-glacier-italy-switzerland/.
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our landscapes change, we are forced to rethink who we
are, where we belong, and what we are capable of absorbing. The physical health effects of climate change are too
many to mention. But the indirect psychological effects of
both slow- and sudden-onset disasters—climate anxiety,
ecoguilt, and the psychological effects of displacement and
diaspora152 —are likewise daunting. In a worst-case climate
world, our sense of self, security, and well-being teeters on
a precipice.153
Third, the political. Even as landscapes and our
sense of place and identity shift, we imagine our political systems largely functioning in standstill mode on a
standstill planet. In today’s almost, but not yet worstcase climate world, mainstream politicians continue to
advance stasis-dependent frameworks—property, gray
infrastructure, and resource extraction—and stasisdriven responses to climate change—carbon taxes,
cap-and-trade regimes, bridge fuels, and technological
fixes. Yet, different visions for the role of law are emerging around the peripheries of mainstream politics. These
visions perceive the shifting ground of climate change
and seek to harness law as a tool not for sustaining the
norm, but instead for engaging (rather than ignoring)
inevitable disruption and creating opportunities to reimagine the world unfettered by fixed boundaries.
Moreover, across the domains of the physical, psychological, and political, law frequently employs concepts of
boundaries to classify humans—to determine who is worthy of inclusion and who will be excluded. These forms of
conceptual boundaries are deeply embedded in our systems
of law and tend to reinforce persistent patterns of inequality. Unaddressed conceptual boundaries intensify historical patterns of othering and exclusion along lines of race,
gender, religion, sexuality, country of origin, and socioeconomic status. Moreover, conceptual boundaries operate
particularly perniciously for those who straddle categories of historical exclusion. Absent efforts to the contrary,
unfettered climate change threatens to further deepen the
subjugating tendencies of law’s conceptual boundaries.
In a worst-case climate world, we will be confronted
with levels of destabilization that challenge us to rethink
what is possible at every level of governance. In this climate-destabilized world, political boundaries are more
mutable and, yet, more important than ever. The role of
local governments in responding to adaptation needs, for
example, becomes increasingly acute even as it becomes
more difficult to constrain climate effects from one territorially bounded unit to another. Equally, the role of
national governments in advancing mitigation, adaptation,
and loss-and-damage responses becomes ever more urgent
even as the futility of acting domestically in the absence

152. See, e.g., Paolo Cianconi et al., The Impact of Climate Change on Mental
Health: A Systematic Descriptive Review, Frontiers Psych. (Mar. 6, 2020),
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyt.2020.00074/full.
153. See, e.g., Jessica Owley, Harnessing Eco-Anxiety and Triaging for the Future,
Env’t L. Prof Blog (Oct. 15, 2021), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
environmental_law/2021/10/harnessing-eco-anxiety-and-triaging-for-thefuture.html.
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of global cooperation becomes clear. In this worst-case climate world, political, ecological, and planetary boundaries
are increasingly tenuous and in tension.
In a stubbornly stasis-oriented world, imagining how
a worst-case climate will alter the physical, psychological, and political parameters of our world remains at the
periphery of our legal imagination. Shifting boundaries
challenge fundamental assumptions about how the rule of
law operates at every level. Bringing these shifting boundaries into focus now allows us to envisage the role that law
can play in averting crisis and advancing positive change in
a worst-case climate world. It also forces us to ask whether
law—with its predilection for boundaries and predictability—is the best tool for the task.

VIII. The 4°C City
This section was authored by Sarah Fox, Associate Professor of
Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law.
Just as rising global temperatures will accelerate change in
ecological systems, a 4°C world will catalyze social changes
in the United States. In some parts of the country, these
changes will include greater need for rapid emergency
responses, heavier reliance on health care systems, and
obsolescence and emergence of industries. In other parts,
they will include the need to accommodate population
influxes and a greater draw on social services. Though it
is impossible to generalize regarding what life in 4°C cities
will be like, it is clear that such a world will require different local responses, of different magnitudes, than we see
currently. Some of the questions that this level of warming
will raise are: What must a city give up in a world of 4°C
warming? What should it be unwilling to lose? And how
might it need to transform?
Many cities will lose both land and people in a 4°C
world. Contemplating that first loss, land, is likely to feel
sacrilegious to many cities. There are currently few incentives, and many disincentives, for a city to shrink its square
footage. Property taxes are generally the primary funding
mechanisms available to local governments.154 That tax
base, tied so explicitly to land and what is on it, means
that a loss of property equals a loss of revenue. But a 4°C
world will render large parts of many cities unlivable and
will require dramatic reconfigurations of others. Many cities will experience the loss of land beset by flooding, fire,
drought, or other destructive forces. Even if these disasters
do not result in the total destruction of the land, they may
well alter its usability and the buildings—and taxpayers—
upon it.
Those realities mean that many cities will lose some of
their property tax base. It also means that cities will be
forced to choose what to protect and what to abandon. Historic sites, cultural objects, and landmarks may need to be
154. See, e.g., Jeff Chapman et al., Pew Charitable Trusts, Local Tax Limitations Can Hamper Fiscal Stability of Cities and Counties (2021),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2021/07/statetaxlimitations_
brief.pdf.
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abandoned in favor of investing resources to protect people
who used to live in the city and those who may remain.
Because along with the land and property, population loss
will be an inevitable part of a 4°C future in some places.
There is no amount of adaptation that will be sufficient
to keep current population levels in place in many cities,
particularly those in coastal areas vulnerable to sea-level
rise or those located in the West, where water resources
will be increasingly scarce and temperatures increasingly
ill-suited for human habitation. Thus, cities will have to
contend with the loss of people. Successful out-migration
may be a best-case scenario, with loss of life to flooding,
heat, and fire a real prospect as well.
Those losses are enormous. They will feel enormous. But
to confront them in a clear-eyed way, cities will need to face
the question of what they can provide in a 4°C future and
what they must retain so they can fulfill their new roles.
Cities will still exist, likely in even larger form as climate
change is expected to fuel massive urbanization.155 And the
COVID-19 pandemic has illuminated the vital role of cities as places where people gather and seek aid. This has long
been the role of cities, and they will continue as important
intersections of public and private space. Cities are likely
to remain a locus for expression of local opinions, needs,
and culture.
Any more generalization than that is difficult, as a 4°C
world will impact communities in distinct ways. As the
level of government closest to the ground, cities are wellpositioned to respond to those shifting and varied needs.
In order to do so, however, cities must retain broad local
authority. This need was illustrated dramatically by the
COVID-19 pandemic.
At different points during the pandemic, local entities
such as cities and school districts have attempted to combat
local spread by implementing mask mandates and other
public health measures. In some cases, state legislatures
have reacted by prohibiting local governments from taking
such actions. This dynamic strips away an important layer
of crisis responsiveness, and makes it very difficult for local
entities to respond to the health and safety needs of their
citizens156 and constituents. Similar preemption dynamics
could make it difficult for local governments to respond in
ways that a 4°C world may require.
There will be times when local authority is exercised in
ways that run counter to the best science and policy on
climate change. For example, local governments in many
states have created barriers to renewable energy facilities
being sited within their boundaries.157 Local governments

155. See, e.g., Abrahm Lustgarten, The Great Climate Migration, N.Y. Times (July
23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/23/magazine/
climate-migration.html.
156. See, e.g., Mark Walsh, Mask Mandate Lawsuits Reflect Bigger Battle: Do
States or Locals Control Schools?, Educ. Wk. (Aug. 27, 2021), https://www.
edweek.org/policy-politics/mask-mandate-lawsuits-reflect-bigger-battle-dostates-or-local-districts-control-schools/2021/08.
157. See, e.g., Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law
School, Opposition to Renewable Energy Facilities in the United
States (2021), https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/
RELDI%20report%20updated%209.10.21.pdf.
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have economic and political incentives to promote development in coastal areas vulnerable to sea-level rise and flooding.158 And parochial actions at the local level have long
been used to limit available housing stock, as well as to
drive gentrification; it would not be surprising to see similar trends in climate destination cities when larger population shifts start occurring.
A call for protecting the capacity for local action in
response to climate change does not and cannot guarantee
the shape of those actions. But even with some inevitably
undesirable local actions, experience has shown that cities are often on the front lines of climate planning and,
depending on the politics of the moment, may be the
only entity in the federal system willing to take action.159
Beyond that, they are the entities most likely to know and
understand the needs of their citizens in a rapidly changing environment, and they are going to need to respond
to large swings in population, public health needs, natural disasters, and more. The federal government and the
states must play an outsized role in making the regulatory
and structural changes that a 4°C future will require, and
can exercise their authority to set regulatory floors for local
government climate response.160 It would be a mistake,
however, to fully strip authority from local governments
to act.
So, what needs to change to allow 4°C cities to fill
the roles required of them? There are of course as many
answers as there are local governments. All, however, are
likely to center on some version of flexibility. Every city will
need a greater ability—and, perhaps, a new willingness—
to understand and interpret climate data and to use that
data in planning for the future. In doing that planning,
both physical and policy agility will be hugely important.
Physically, cities must recognize when they are entering
infrastructure time horizons that no longer make sense;
having the foresight to avoid committing funds and locking in obsolete physical patterns (e.g., water lines in floodprone areas, new development unsupported by available
water resources, massive infrastructure aimed at serving
shrinking populations, and others) will be crucial for city
survival. Cities must also be willing to reimagine planning
documents to account for new physical realities and changing demographics.
On the policy side, cities must be nimble enough to
adjust to the needs of their citizens and willing to engage
with those needs without being too wedded to the past.
Depending on the city, that may mean managing water
rationing, adapting the housing supply, making decisions
about whether or not to rebuild in areas impacted by natural disaster, providing health and disaster response services,
joining forces with other cities for service provision, and

It may seem an unlikely connection, but while reading
Robin Kundis Craig and J.B. Ruhl’s excellent (if depressing!) article 4°C,163 I found myself thinking about the Disney movie Frozen II.164 Frozen II presents a parable about
climate change through the story of a young queen named
Elsa leading her country during a period of rapid change in
the natural environment. Amidst rapid changes and uncertain circumstances, Elsa’s governance approach becomes
“do the next right thing.”
Like the characters in the film, we find ourselves in a
time of deep unknowns, where there are no predictable or
“correct” answers. Conditions are changing and evolving
more quickly than the U.S. Congress or agencies can regulate. Forecasting is complicated; creating political will is

158. See, e.g., Megan Mayhew Bergman, Florida Is Drowning. Condos Are Still
Being Built. Can’t Humans See the Writing on the Wall?, Guardian (Feb.
15, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/feb/15/
florida-climate-change-coastal-real-estate-rising-seas.
159. See, e.g., Sarah Fox, Localizing Environmental Federalism, 54 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 133, 149-51 (2020).
160. See, e.g., S.B. 2408, 102d Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2021), available at https://
www.ilga.gov/legislation/102/SB/PDF/10200SB2408lv.pdf.

161. See Erin Scharff, Cities on Their Own: Local Revenue When Federalism Fails,
48 Fordham Urb. L.J. 919 (2021).
162. See National League of Cities, Principles of Home Rule for the
21st Century (2020), https://www.nlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/
Home-Rule-Principles-ReportWEB-2-1.pdf.
163. Ruhl & Craig, supra note 2.
164. Frozen II (Disney 2019), https://movies.disney.com/frozen-2.
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on and on. All of that will require the 4°C city to have
greater flexibility in financing and in collaborating with
other jurisdictions.
As described above, local governments cannot afford to
lose this authority over climate responsiveness, and many
may in fact need to acquire that authority in the first
instance. Broadly speaking, this flexibility and autonomy
are something that can only be—and, where it is lacking,
should be—conveyed by the state. The prospect of a 4°C
future, and the limited capacities of all levels of government, should serve as an impetus for a more expansive idea
of local authority. States could ensure local flexibility by,
for example, reforming available local revenue sources161;
allowing for and encouraging regional planning around climate impacts; putting in place forms of home-rule authority that presume local ability to act; and moving away from
deregulatory preemption.162 Cities in a 4°C world will have
much to contend with. One thing they should not have to
worry about is the authority to act.
The 4°C city is likely to be similar in mission to current
cities, but will perhaps have a very different footprint and
makeup. Current local government structures, including
financing mechanisms, policy incentives, limited authority, and entrenched commitments, make it extremely difficult to accommodate this coming reality. Now is the time
for cities, states, and the federal government to ensure that
cities that will be impacted by climate change (read: all of
them) have the authority and flexibility they need to prepare for a 4°C future.

IX. Climate Change Lessons
From a Disney Princess
This section was authored by Karen Bradshaw, Professor
of Law and Mary Sigler Fellow, Arizona State University
Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.
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near-impossible. Yet, the effects of climate change necessitate ex post responses. Responding to droughts, wildfires,
hurricanes, and floods inherently relies on small groups of
people working together in localized ways. Fortunately,
the tool of stakeholder collaborations can fill this void
between the lack of agency knowledge and preparation
and the urgent local demands of disaster response, providing an important, yet overlooked, piece to effective climate
change response.
Stakeholder collaborations are small groups of people
working cooperatively in an ongoing way to guide agency
land and resource management decisions. In 2017, the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
hired me as an academic consultant to create a longitudinal
overview of the use of collaborations by 13 federal land
and resource management agencies. The resulting report
showed that thousands of stakeholder collaborations exist,
a level of governance that merges localized considerations
with federal agency action, which is largely unexplored in
administrative law scholarship. Subsequent work explored
the doctrinal questions165 surrounding collaboration and
ways that collaborations can be used to improve representation in federal agency decisionmaking, highlighting the
benefits and downsides of this tool.
Most vitally to considering Craig and Ruhl’s thoughtprovoking article, the ACUS research revealed that much
agency action in climate change response and mitigation is
happening through federal land and management agencies
engaging in collaboration. This is good news. Agencies are
experts in using collaborations; courts are good at assessing
them. We have a hidden tool in our belt, one developed
before it was so crucially needed.
In the future, I plan to write a paper outlining how
stakeholder collaborations are vital to the kind of adaptive
response for which Craig and Ruhl advocate. For now, I
sketch three brief lessons drawn from years of studying
stakeholder collaborations.
First, it is time to let go of baselines and instead embrace
values of ecological responsibility. In a changing climate,
we will expend ever-increasing amounts of resources if
we work toward the goal of preserving a rapidly shifting
natural world. Our focus should shift from preservation
to building and maintaining rich natural environments—
albeit with the understanding that they may look different than the environments of the past. It may help to look
to traditional ecological knowledge embedded in indigenous conceptions of nature (which are many and varied)
to understand the earth as a living thing—forever changing—while also understanding that our obligations to act
responsibly toward the natural world are fixed.
Second, the present degree of polarization must end—
our survival depends on it. As the parents sitting in the
movie theater know, there is little to be gained from fights
over who started a conflict or who did what to whom.

165. Karen Bradshaw, Stakeholder Collaboration as an Alternative to Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 2019 BYU L. Rev. 655 (2020), available at https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3097075.
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Instead, maintaining functioning and healthy families
requires adopting skills of healthy communication in which
all participants can respectfully express their opinions and
reach negotiated outcomes. National politics are not so different. Stakeholder collaborations force those with strongly
held but conflicting objectives to negotiate,166 shifting from
he-said, she-said to an adult conversation—kind, firm, fair,
compassionate, and willing to find a middle ground.
Third, we must be bold and welcoming of new and
unconventional ideas, which means pursuing and valuing
diverse ideas and perspectives. We need new approaches.
I believe that marginalized members of society—those
most absent from academic discourse and positions of
federal policymaking—hold the insights that are key to
our collective survival. For example, the use of traditional
ecological knowledge to restore fire167 to the forested
northern California landscape or manage caribou herds
in Alaska168 combines indigenous land management practices with agency action. Stakeholder collaborations are a
way to radically democratize environmental decisionmaking and incorporate more diverse perspectives, which are
sorely needed.
Frozen II taught millions of American children a lesson,
which adults need to learn too. In problems rest opportunities. Climate change is an invitation to redefine and
better articulate our values—those toward the environment, one another, and marginalized communities. Values
guide actions amidst rapidly changing circumstances and
deep uncertainty. Stakeholder collaborations are a forum
for doing so while producing desperately needed adaptive
governance. They are the way we can continue to—one
step ahead of another—do the next right thing.

X.

More Better Information as 4°C
Preparedness: Ecosystem Benefit
Flows and Community Engagement

This section was authored by Keith Hirokawa, Professor of
Law, Albany Law School.
From an ecosystem services perspective, access to nature—
and the benefits that come from functioning ecosystems—is poorly distributed across class, race, gender, and
throughout communities. We might explain the divide by
comparing ecosystem services demand between rural and
denser population areas, or the manner in which our cities and towns have become socio-ecological traps,169 where

166. Karen Bradshaw, Agency Engagement With Stakeholder Collaborations, in
Wildfire Policy and Beyond, 51 Ariz. St. L.J. 437 (2019), available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3433476.
167. Laurence Du Sault, The Karuk Tribe Fights a Growing Wildfire Threat and a
Lack of Funding, High Country News (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.hcn.
org/issues/51.6/tribal-affairs-in-california-the-karuk-tribe-fights-a-growingwildfire-threat-and-a-lack-of-funding.
168. Bradshaw, supra note 166.
169. Jonathan W. Long & Frank K. Lake, Escaping Social-Ecological Traps Through
Tribal Stewardship on National Forest Lands in the Pacific Northwest, United
States of America, 23 Ecology & Soc’y 10 (2018).

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4053843

3-2022

Copyright © 2022 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

perceived need continues to drive reallocation of water into
cities in a way that reflects the disproportionate appropriation of ecosystems by cities.170 We might also recognize
that occupation of upstream areas, particularly rural and
suburban areas outside of cities and towns, places an enormous amount of power in the hands of those who manage,
but may not directly benefit from, ecosystem service flows.
Given such allocation challenges of ecosystem services,
resource decisionmaking is often disconnected from the
communities and individuals that would benefit from ecosystem services, and this divide is pervasive at the urban/
rural interface. Moreover, the divide will become increasingly acute as climate change continues to drive more
intense storms, droughts, wildfires, and disease, as well as
rising temperatures and continuation of the human and
ecosystem migration.
How do we bridge the gap? One promising avenue
involves mapping of ecosystem service benefit flows
between and among geographically distinct communities. Ecosystem services—a form of wealth—concern
the benefits that humans derive from functioning ecosystems, and include provisioning services (e.g., goods),
regulating services (e.g., nutrient regulation), supporting
services (e.g., structural and other mechanisms), and cultural services (e.g., spiritual, recreational, and aesthetic).
Ecosystem services research illustrates the enormous costs
of losing functioning ecosystem services (regulating, supporting, and cultural, but also trade offs and temporal loss
of provisioning services, such as forest harvest or conversion at the expense of habitat productivity or flood and
erosion control).
Mapping the flows of ecosystem services helps to identify life-supporting benefits (to humans) from functioning
ecosystem services and, in some ways more importantly,
helps to identify the beneficiaries of those services, a neat
trick that will also inform the distribution of ecosystem
benefits. Consequently, although the ecosystem services
approach may not solve all of our equity problems, the
information generated through benefit-flows mapping will
facilitate more effective and equitable resource management planning beyond local borders in the following ways.
First, mapping ecosystem benefit flows begins with an
inventory of the ecosystem services at hand, their supply
and demand. Understanding ecosystem services is a crucial step away from the resourcification of ecosystems,171
the process of conceptually transforming ecosystems from
the processes they engage in to a pile of commodifiable
resources for the market. The spatially explicit information generated in benefit-flows mapping “provides baseline data to measure new future gains or losses for policy

170. See Carl Folke et al., Ecosystem Appropriation by Cities, 26 Ambio 167, 171
(1997).
171. Timothy Luke, Eco-Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation, in Living With Nature: Environmental Politics as
Cultural Discourse (Frank Fisher & Maarten Hajer eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 1999), available at http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/
view/79/91.
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impact assessment,”172 engendering more effective planning decisions. Moreover, mapping flows will provide
better information for understanding shifting risk factors
resulting from ecosystem migration, and for targeting areas
where fruitful ecosystem investments could accommodate
human migration.
Second, mapping these flows helps to foster understanding of the relationships between different stakeholders and
the ecosystem processes that provide benefits: “Understanding of ES [ecosystem services] flows is essential for
understanding ES demand as they allow people to actually
benefit from a good or service.”173 In many cases, mapping
illustrates the ways multifunctional landscapes provide
cascading services, suggesting that attention should be
given to subunits and specific benefit demands that might
be overlooked (and thus ignored) from generalizations
about ecosystem-wide services.174 Benefit-flow mapping
also helps to “identify which regions are critical to maintaining the supply and flow of benefits for specific beneficiary groups.”175
Third, mapping benefit flows will provide a better
understanding of the power relationships between ecosystem service beneficiaries, with recognition that “those
stakeholders able to manage . . . keystone ecological properties and ecosystem services can affect the well-being of
other stakeholder groups by determining the ecosystem’s
capacity to provide services and/or by controlling them.”176
Finally, if we want all communities to improve resiliency,
engage in adaptive measures, and otherwise be prepared
for climate change, we have to think in terms of climate
justice. Benefit-flows mapping will provide an accessible
depiction of the ways that geographically distinct communities are related and connected. It will assist as stakeholders engage in communicating needs and priorities among
ecosystem benefits and empower more specific and effective communication within and among power relationships, ensuring a more equitable allocation of resources to
where they are needed.
Mapping benefit flows is an act of community empowerment. The process will activate perspectives on accountability and collaboration in the preparedness process. It
provides granular-level information about the different
dependencies and power structures among forest, watershed, agricultural, and groundwater-dependent communities. And, in the end, it will give us all something to
talk about.

172. Joachim Maes et al., Mapping Ecosystem Services for Policy Support and Decision Making in the European Union, 1 Ecosystem Servs. 31, 32 (2012).
173. Sarah Wolff et al., Mapping Ecosystem Services Demand: A Review of Current
Research and Future Perspectives, 55 Ecological Indicators 159 (2015).
174. Katja Malmborg et al., Mapping Regional Livelihood Benefits From Local Ecosystem Services Assessments in Rural Sahel, 13 PLoS ONE e0192019, at 14
(2018).
175. Kenneth J. Bagstad et al., From Theoretical to Actual Ecosystem Services: Mapping Beneficiaries and Spatial Flows in Ecosystem Service Assessments, 19 Ecology & Soc’y 64, 73 (2014).
176. María R. Felipe-Lucia et al., Ecosystem Services Flows: Why Stakeholders’
Power Relationships Matter, 10 PLoS ONE e0132232, at 17 (2015).
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XI. Harnessing Eco-Anxiety and
Triaging for the Future
This section was authored by Jessica Owley, Professor of Law
and Faculty Director for the Environmental Law Program,
University of Miami School of Law.
Our children177 are scared178 and anxious.179 Our climate scientists are facing unprecedented levels of stress180
and depression.181 The future appears a dark and scary182
place. Sometimes, it seems like the only sensible engaged
response is to pour all energy and attention into climate
change mitigation. Climate change impacts are already
severe, and there seems no realistic scenario where things
aren’t worsening.183 Through the Paris Agreement,184 the
nations of the world agreed to hold global warming to 2°C
above pre-industrial levels while (1) acknowledging that
the real goal should be 1.5°C185 and (2) failing to set in
motion any measures that would realistically achieve186 the
2°C goal. It is understandable that many of us are feeling
stressed and depressed.
Some activists187 argue that we should embrace this ecoanxiety and use it to motivate action. If nothing else has
spurred us to act, maybe fear will be the final push we need.
The challenge is how to harness our eco-anxiety into
a fight for climate mitigation without leaving behind our
other environmental or societal aspirations. The time has
come for us to make the hard choices for what we want our
world to be. Our economies were built on the idea that we
can have it all. We throw the word “sustainability” around,

177. Laura M. Holson, Climate Change Is Scaring Kids. Here’s How to Talk to
Them., N.Y. Times (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/
science/climate-change-children-education.html.
178. Jason Plautz, The Environmental Burden of Generation Z, Wash. Post (Feb.
3, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/magazine/2020/02/03/ecoanxiety-is-overwhelming-kids-wheres-line-between-education-alarmism/.
179. Elizabeth Marks et al., Young People’s Voices on Climate Anxiety,
Government Betrayal, and Moral Injury: A Global Phenomenon
(2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3918955.
180. Daniel Gilford et al., The Emotional Toll of Climate Change on Science Professionals, Eos (Dec. 6, 2019), https://eos.org/features/
the-emotional-toll-of-climate-change-on-science-professionals.
181. Marissa Fessenden, Even Climate Scientists Are Getting Depressed by Our Lack
of Progress, Smithsonian Mag. (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/even-climate-scientists-are-getting-depressed-ourlack-progress-180953252/.
182. Id.
183. “Climate Commitments Not on Track to Meet Paris Agreement Goals” as NDC
Synthesis Report Is Published, United Nations Climate Change (Feb.
26, 2021), https://unfccc.int/news/climate-commitments-not-on-track-tomeet-paris-agreement-goals-as-ndc-synthesis-report-is-published.
184. United Nations Climate Change, supra note 1.
185. IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the
Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above Pre-Industrial Levels and
Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of
Strengthening the Global Response to theThreat of Climate Change,
SustainableDevelopment,andEffortstoEradicatePoverty (ValérieMasson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/.
186. Peiran R. Liu & Adrian E. Raftery, Country-Based Rate of Emissions Reductions Should Increase by 80% Beyond Nationally Determined Contributions to
Meet the 2°C Target, 2 Comm. Earth & Env’t art. 29 (2021), https://www.
nature.com/articles/s43247-021-00097-8.
187. Jonathan Davies, Suffering From Eco-Anxiety? Embrace It! Here Is
Why . . ., Beeco (Jan. 4, 2022), https://www.beeco.green/blog/
how-to-embrace-eco-anxiety/.
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suggesting that there is some magic sweet spot we can find
where we meet our economic, environmental, and social
goals simultaneously. But it hasn’t worked. The economic
drivers remain dominant while environmental and social
goals seem increasingly unattainable. As we look out at the
4°C (and rising) world we have created, it seems time to
acknowledge that we just can’t have nice things anymore.
Now comes the winter of our hard decisions. What
are we willing to sacrifice? Should we fight to protect an
endangered desert tortoise188 if it will hamper our development of renewable energy facilities? Are we willing to rely
on nuclear power189 in exchange for getting rid of our coalburning power plants? The questions get even trickier when
we add climate change adaptation choices. Are we willing
to put our parks and special places190 to more active use as
climate migration forces people and facilities to relocate?
Environmentalists are now so worried about climate
change that our eco-anxiety is making us willing to compromise and sacrifice our other environmental goals. Yet
are these really the places to push for change? We should all
make changes in our daily lives. We should drive less and
stop eating beef. We should reduce the single-use plastics in
our lives and question our consumption habits. But environmentalists being better environmentalists is not moving
any needle. Compromising conservation goals to combat
climate change might be needed, but only after we have
tackled the bigger structural problems in our economy.
International climate law is guided by the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). Could
we take that same principle and think about it not across
countries, but across interest areas? Why isn’t it the big economic players that should change? Environmentalists may
find themselves willing to sacrifice protected lands and
endangered species, but should they? Doing so is at heart
an acknowledgement that we are going to continue propping up industries that mismanage and burn fossil fuels.
What does this lead to? Combining our eco-anxiety
with righteous anger. So, we are angry and anxious and
the only people who are willing to act aren’t the ones we
need to act.
And now I have written myself into a corner. I have
no solution, especially not one that can be expounded on
in a short essay. As professors of environmental and climate change law, we all use techniques in the classroom
to prevent our students from becoming too depressed. I
show how, despite the challenges that remain, our air is
cleaner since the passage of the Clean Air Act (CAA).191
Many of our waterways are in better shape even with the

188. Stephanie Castillo, Desert Tortoise Deaths Raise Concerns as Solar Farms Solve
Energy Need, Las Vegas Rev.-J. (July 30, 2021), https://www.reviewjournal.
com/news/science-and-technology/desert-tortoise-deaths-raise-concernsas-solar-farms-solve-energy-need-2408456/.
189. Richard Rhodes, Why Nuclear Power Must Be Part of the Energy Solution,
Yale Env’t 360 (July 19, 2018), https://e360.yale.edu/features/why-nuclear-power-must-be-part-of-the-energy-solution-environmentalists-climate.
190. Jessica Owley, Climate-Induced Human Displacement and Conservation
Lands, 58 Hous. L. Rev. 665 (2021), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3739577.
191. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618.
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economic and population growth we have experienced. I
point to movements in big cities in the United States and
Europe to reduce cars and encourage electric vehicles. We
have better control of pesticides and disposal of toxics. But
frankly, I am at a loss when trying to do a climate change
pep talk. Our political and economic leaders continue to
deny, ignore, and obfuscate.
Decades of knowledge about the problem has not
resulted in significant progress. Furthermore, the COVID
pandemic illustrates that we (as a species and definitely we
as Americans) are willing to let millions of people die even
when science is clear and solutions are not that onerous.192
Climate change solutions won’t be as easy as getting a vaccine or wearing a mask. It won’t be simply flying less and
carrying around a reusable bag.
The only glimmer of hope in the climate change debate
is that the number of people paying attention is growing.
The number of people morphing their eco-anxiety into
righteous anger is increasing. Next time my students look
to me for hope, I will have none to offer. But maybe anger
is what they need instead.

XII. Rawls@4°C
This section was authored by J.B. Ruhl, David Daniels
Allen Distinguished Chair of Law, Vanderbilt Law School,
and James Salzman, Donald Bren Distinguished Professor
of Environmental Law with joint appointments at the Bren
School and University of California, Los Angeles Law School.
The “veil of ignorance” thought experiment devised by the
philosopher John Rawls has long haunted law school seminar rooms and lecture halls. And for good reason. In his
ambitious 1971 book, A Theory of Justice, Rawls offered a
way to determine just principles of law from a purely selfish
perspective. What would he have to say to us in the era of
climate change?
Imagine, he says, that you are the lawgiver operating
today. If acting purely from self-interest, one would expect
you to establish laws that favor you and your friends/family/colleagues. No surprise that we see this around us every
day. Rawls’ thought experiment, though, changes the
game. You are still the lawgiver, but you are now operating
behind a veil of ignorance. Once you have established the
laws and removed the veil, you will then learn whether you
are rich or poor, white or Black, young or old, a citizen of
France or Bangladesh, and so on.
Rawls argues that, operating in ignorance of your identity, you will choose principles that ensure the fair and
equitable allocation of rights, duties, and opportunities
among everyone in the society. Since you don’t know who
you will be, best to provide for every possibility and favor
people equally.

192. Paul Krugman, The Quiet Rage of the Responsible, N.Y. Times (Aug. 19,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/19/opinion/covid-masks-vaccine-mandates.html.
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Prof. Edith Brown Weiss took Rawls’ veil of ignorance
one step further, asking what it means for sustainable development.193 In her version, you not only do not know who
you are, you also do not know when in the future you will
live. It could be in the present, or three or six generations
hence. If you were negotiating under this veil of ignorance,
what types of rules would you want to impose?
In this framing, our obligations to future generations
become immediate. Professor Weiss proposes a principle of
“intergenerational equity” that would seek to ensure future
people will “inherit the Earth in as good a condition as did
their ancestors and with at least comparable access to its
resources.”194 Since you don’t know who you will be, best to
provide for every possibility and favor people equally, now
and in the future.
Let’s play this mind game a little further. Imagine, if
you will, that you are still the ruler operating behind a veil
of ignorance—you do not know who you will be or when
in the future you will be. But, and here’s the twist, you
do know that the world is unavoidably on a path to 4°C
over the next 200 years. You could live anywhere on that
path—2°C? 3°C? 4°C?—you don’t know. With this knowledge, what laws would you establish today to best ensure a
fair and equitable society over the next 200 years of climate
change? And how would these be different than Professor
Weiss’ framing for sustainable development?
The climate change veil of ignorance changes the game
in two important respects. First, although scientists can
develop rough scenarios of what the world experiences along
the climate change path, significant uncertainty remains,
especially at local scales. You’ll have to design rules for the
future now without a firm grasp of what the future looks
like for many people. Second, it is more likely than not that
climate conditions for many people will deteriorate, making it nearly impossible to set up rules in the present that
will ensure future generations inherit an earth in as good a
shape as prior generations experienced. You can’t stop sea
levels or temperatures from rising, so you can’t satisfy the
goal of the Weiss thought experiment.
These constraints change the kind of thinking that
Rawls and Weiss expected of their rulemaker in three ways.
First, given the 200 years of vastly changing conditions that
lie ahead, the rules you design today must be rapidly adaptable as predicted changes evolve and unforeseen changes
arise. If you wind up living in the 3°C world, you likely
would not want to be bound by rules that applied in the
1.5°C world. So, you must design an adaptive governance
regime, not a fixed set of rules with the hope of locking in
socially just conditions in the present and going forward.
Second, you’ll need to anticipate tipping points and
nonlinear change trajectories without knowing when they
will be triggered or what the other side looks like. When
will massive domestic migration start, and where do the
migrants go? What if you are one of those migrants? Your

193. Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable Development, 8 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 19 (1992).
194. Id. at 21.
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adaptive governance regime will need to include a substantial planning and monitoring component using updated
scenario projections—what social scientists refer to as
anticipatory governance.
Finally, in addition to the resource consumption trade
off dilemmas that sit at the heart of Weiss’ exercise, your
rules will also require an ongoing process for determining
how much to invest at any given time in protective adaptation measures for future generations. What if you live in
the future as a resident of a city that did not build adequate
flood control infrastructure or heat wave relief opportunities? But how much should a previous generation have
invested? You can’t possibly make all those decisions in
the present—there’s too much uncertainty. The adaptiveanticipatory governance regime you design today thus must
focus not only on sustainable resource conservation, but
also on capacity, ensuring continuous decisionmaking for
provision of physical and social adaptation infrastructure.
In summary, the climate change veil of ignorance will
demand a much more fluid governance process, one that
continually anticipates unforeseeable change, nimbly
adapts the rules, and manages over long time frames for
adaptation measures that equitably protect future generations. The fairness question will not be how to ensure
future generations enjoy the same quality of life, but how
to protect those groups (including possibly you) that will
be much worse off.

Although some Republican officials have signaled a willingness to work on mitigation and adaptation policies,
political promises to address climate change still largely
come from only one party: the Democrats. In fact, according to the Center for American Progress, 139 members of
the 117th Congress reject climate science and the reality of
a warming world; all 139 are Republicans.195 State governors follow a similar pattern, with several Republican governors vowing to fight the Joseph Biden Administration’s
efforts to lower emissions before specific policy proposals
even surface.196
Climate change is not the only problem that is complicated by the political polarization that pervades our
political and social institutions, but it is likely the problem
that will cost future generations the most. The most recent
IPCC report is clear: we can avoid the worst-case scenarios
for warming only if we act today. As I write this, Demo-

cratic members of Congress cannot even reach agreement
among themselves about how much to spend on pressing
problems including climate change.197 The political gridlock shows no signs of abating. It is the source of the anger
and anxiety that Jessica Owley describes in her essay (see
Part XI).
Can we assess the costs of this political failure to address
climate change? Newer climate models suggest that costs
are high. These models, which are considered in the latest IPCC assessment,198 use a set of five narratives about
the future of global socioeconomic development to forecast
different warming scenarios. Created by an international
team of experts, these five “shared socioeconomic pathways” (SSPs) offer different visions of the future based on
the influence of various socioeconomic factors.199
The “regional rivalry” narrative (SSP 3) is the worst-case
scenario because it presents the steepest challenges to both
mitigation and adaptation. This is a world defined by rising
nationalism and decreasing global cooperation. It is a 4°C
world unable to adapt because democratic institutions fail,
and cooperation is impossible. Although this development
narrative contemplates rivalry at a global scale, political
gridlock and polarization at the domestic level only make
the international trends in that direction more likely—
especially when these divisions undermine climate policies
in wealthy nations like the United States.
In their essay (see Part XII), J.B. Ruhl and Jim Salzman
modify the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” thought experiment to give the lawmaker knowledge that the world will
warm to 4°C over the next 200 years. Their essay made
me wonder what effect this knowledge would have on our
foundational constitutional commitments. Understanding that society will have to adapt to a warming world, we
would no doubt want to make possible the kind of anticipatory and adaptive governance that they envision. But could
we accomplish this without throwing out much of our constitutional structure?
Would we make different choices? For example, our
constitutional structure is designed to make laws difficult
to enact and change. Would we design our political institutions differently so that it is easier to change the status quo?
Would we give states less control over national elections?
Would we preclude political gerrymandering of election
districts? And would we be willing to commit ourselves to
limitations on speech that current First Amendment doctrine does not? For example, would we permit the regulation of false and misleading speech when it undermines the
ability of others to speak? Would we commit ourselves to
meaningful regulation of money in politics?
These are big questions that would ignite contentious
debates today. I do not mean to suggest answers, but only

195. Ari Drennen & Sally Hardin, Climate Deniers in the 117th Congress, Center for Am. Progress (Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.americanprogress.
org/article/climate-deniers-117th-congress/.
196. See Nichola Groom, Some Republican States Would Fight Forced Utility Emissions Cuts Under Biden Climate Agenda, Reuters (Dec. 2, 2020), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-climatechange-republican-states/somerepublican-states-would-fight-forced-utility-emissions-cuts-under-bidenclimate-agenda-idUSKBN28C1NK.

197. Geof Koss et al., Democrats Delay Infrastructure Vote as Talks Continue, E&E News (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.eenews.net/articles/
democrats-delay-infrastructure-vote-as-talks-continue/.
198. IPCC, supra note 95.
199. Brian C. O’Neill, The Roads Ahead: Narratives for Shared Socioeconomic
Pathways Describing World Futures in the 21st Century, 42 Global Env’t
Change 169 (2017), available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/abs/pii/S0959378015000060.

XIII. The Costs of Political Polarization
and Gridlock
This section was authored by Shannon Roesler, Professor of
Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
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to highlight some of the constitutional commitments that
enable or at least aggravate political polarization and ideological division—and to acknowledge that these commitments are deeply entrenched in our constitutional culture.
Ideas and norms grounded in the separation of powers,
federalism, and free speech are not easily challenged.
So, if we are to break the gridlock on climate change, we
will need climate change to break out of its partisan prison.
Work in cultural cognition studies shows that people will
hold onto beliefs even when credible evidence proves them
wrong, when those beliefs are closely tied to their social
and cultural identities.200 If acknowledging the scientific consensus regarding human-caused climate change
requires breaking from your group’s belief system, then it is
less costly to you to continue denying it. We are seeing this
dynamic play out with the anti-vaccination movement during the COVID-19 pandemic, as some anti-vaccine groups
invent new narratives to justify their continued rejection of
vaccine safety and efficacy.201
There are signs that the cost-benefit calculus is shifting
for some Republicans in Congress who now acknowledge
the threat that climate change poses.202 We need more of
these voices to speak now and speak loudly. There was a
moment about 30 years ago when climate change had more
bipartisan support.203 It must happen again. Although we
may feel today that we have little in common with people on the other side of the political divide, we will share
in whatever future we make for ourselves now. The costs
of continued gridlock are simply too great to give up on
bridging the divide.

XIV. Contemplating Equity From the Deck of
the Titanic: A Metaphoric Meditation
for a 4°C World
This section was authored by Robin Kundis Craig, Robert
C. Packard Trustee Chair in Law, University of Southern
California Gould School of Law.
Contemplating a world possibly heading toward a state of
being 4°C warmer, on global average, than it was before
the Industrial Revolution204 potentially changes how we
think about social equity. Of course, climate change has
already added at least a couple of new twists to the dis-

200. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection: An Experimental Study, 8 Judgment & Decision Making 407 (2013),
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2182588.
201. See Dylan Scott, Why People Who Don’t Trust Vaccines Are Embracing Unproven Drugs, Vox (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.vox.com/coronavirus-covid19/22686147/covid-19-vaccine-betadine-hydroxychloroquine-ivermectin-trump-conspiracy.
202. See Matthew Daly, In Break With Trump, House GOP Forms Group on
Climate Change, AP News (June 23, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-business-climate-climate-change-e1f0f572a7b5841bb6141456776bafec.
203. Scott Waldman, Bush Had a Lasting Impact on Climate and Air Policy, E&E
News (Dec. 3, 2018), available at https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/bush-had-a-lasting-impact-on-climate-and-air-policy/.
204. See generally Ruhl & Craig, supra note 2.
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cussion of social equity, notably asking what is equitable
between the global North and the global South (or, developed and developing nations)205 or between the current
and future generations (or, intergenerational equity).206 A
closer parallel to the equity issues that a 4°C world creates,
however, is the equity problem that arises with respect to
the nations and cultures who are already facing existential
threats, such as many native villages in Alaska207 or Pacific
Island nations.208
A 4°C warmer world, however, universalizes the existential threat so that it is no longer possible to distinguish
communities that might cease to exist from those that face
no such risk: we will all be at risk of losing our homes,
communities, culture, and lives. This essay argues that the
distinct possibility that we are heading toward that universalized existential crisis should prompt a conversation
about what our current social equity priorities should actually be. Specifically, we should be modeling how efforts to
improve social equity now, including in the United States,
correlate to increasing universal survival equity later.
However, long experience presenting various stages of
the 4°C article has taught me that fully grasping the ramifications of a 4°C warmer world does not come easily to
many people. As a result, I ask readers to indulge in an
extended metaphor.
The deck chairs on the Titanic are not arranged so that
all passengers would have fair access to them. For that matter, all of the ship’s amenities are inequitably distributed,
from food to medical care to cabin space. Many of the
passengers enjoying the benefits of first class can afford to
be there only because their parents, grandparents, or greatgrandparents seized and exploited the wealth and labor
of colonized people in the global South, establishing the
white privilege from which these passengers have benefitted their entire lives.
In contrast, many of the passengers in steerage (third
class) don’t really deserve to be there, either, having been
trapped by an exploitative capitalistic system of labor in the
lower classes.209 Nevertheless, they still benefit from white
privilege, as evidenced by the almost complete lack of nonwhite passengers210 on this oh-so-prestigious crossing. Even
205. These differences in perspective continue to influence, for example,
negotiations at Conferences of the Parties (COPs) for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. E.g., Sinan Ülgen,
How Deep Is the North-South Divide on Climate Negotiations?, Carnegie Eur. (Oct. 6, 2021), https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/10/06/
how-deep-is-north-south-divide-on-climate-negotiations-pub-85493.
206. E.g., Simon Caney, Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity, and the Social
Discount Rate, in The Ethical Underpinnings of Climate Change Economics 41 (Adrian Walsh et al. eds., Routledge 2017).
207. Dalia Faheid, Indigenous Tribes Facing Displacement in Alaska and Louisiana Say the U.S. Is Ignoring Climate Threats, Inside Climate News
(Sept.
13,
2021),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/13092021/
indigenous-tribes-alaska-louisiana/.
208. Saber Salem, Climate Change and the Sinking Island States in the Pacific, E-Int’l Rel. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.e-ir.info/2020/01/09/
climate-change-and-the-sinking-island-states-in-the-pacific/.
209. David White, Titanic: Passengers Famously Separated by Class, Soc. Stud.
for Kids, https://www.socialstudiesforkids.com/articles/worldhistory/titanic_passengers.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
210. Devon Link, Fact Check: Black Woman Didn’t Drown When Titanic Sank, USA Today (Aug. 13, 2020, 2:22 PM), https://www.
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so, their safety is far less protected, and if violence breaks
out belowdecks, it is questionable whether anyone will do
anything about it. The environment that these people must
live in211 is also far less pleasant, although, admittedly,
often better than what they were used to at home—close
quarters, poor air circulation, shared meals and sanitation
facilities, and fellow travelers who are often sick, both from
seasickness and shared contagions.
No doubt about it: the Titanic needs an equity overhaul.
However, those day-to-day inequities among the people on
board, or between the people who got to be on the Titanic
and those who did not, pale in importance in light of one
critical fact: the ship is on a collision course with an iceberg, and there aren’t enough lifeboats for everyone.
The question of how to fit climate change survival
equity into the more general pursuit of social equity is a
debate worth having, given the increasing probability that
a significantly warmer planet is in all of our futures. In
terms of the Titanic, should we continue putting energy
into rearranging the deck chairs (and other amenities)? Or
should we try to get a few more lifeboats built before the
ship goes down?
Of course, answering those questions would be a whole
lot easier if we had the answer to another, critical one: Does
immediately redistributing amenities more equitably help to
get more lifeboats built and equitably accessed, or does the
redistribution effort result in fewer people surviving overall?
Contemplating survival equity potentially raises thorny
ethical choices, including—although this is by no means
yet established—that there might be trade offs between
pursuing day-to-day social equity now and ensuring the
most equitable survival five to 15 decades into the future.
Accepting the real possibility of a 4°C increase in global
average temperature by the end of this century or very
soon thereafter (and maybe earlier) complicates how one
thinks about every aspect of human society, and that
includes equity.
The first issue is definitional: what do we mean by climate change survival equity? That question raises the most
difficult aspect of contemplating equity in connection with
a future that is 4°C warmer than the present: people are
going to die. How to keep that reality from devolving into
“them versus us” politics is a serious governance challenge
for a 4°C future. On the real Titanic, after all, status was a
major determinant of whether a person survived: approximately 76% of both the crew and third-class passengers
perished, compared to 68% of the total number of people
on board, 58% of the second-class passengers, and 39% of
the first-class passengers.212 First-class women and children
passengers, in contrast, survived at a rate of about 97%.213
Given that the risk of death for everyone increases dramatically as global average temperature rises, climate

usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/08/13/fact-check-black-womandidnt-drown-when-titanic-sank/3291094001/.
211. BBC, What Was Life Like on Board Titanic?, https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/
topics/z8mpfg8/articles/zkg9dxs (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
212. White, supra note 209.
213. Id.
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change survival equity in a 4°C warmer world cannot be
premised on reducing the absolute risk of dying for individuals in the world’s most vulnerable populations. Instead,
the problem is one of bringing the relative risks of dying
into some sort of global parity. Of course, “global parity” is
also problematic, given that climate change affects different parts of the globe differently and that there are inherent
biological differences between individuals regarding their
vulnerabilities, such as to heat stroke.
Given these complications, perhaps a negative definition
is the best place to start the discussion: 4°C climate change
survival equity should mean that any individual’s chances
of surviving and thriving are not statistically correlated
with the person’s race, ethnicity, class, religion, socially
assigned gender-based status, or relationship to colonialism. Instead, the 4°C world will be a lot more equitable
if a person’s chances of survival are, on the whole, either
(1) relatively random from a social policy perspective (e.g.,
the result of genetics or freak disasters); (2) based on characteristics that we all will share (e.g., vulnerabilities associated with aging or special protections accorded children);
or (3) the result of individual choice (e.g., refusing to move
out of harm’s way when all individuals have the means and
opportunity to do so).
The second issue is how to proceed in trying to achieve
survival equity. Following the recommendation of 4°C, we
should be thinking about the relationship between day-today equity and climate change survival equity in terms of
scenarios.214 Three general categories of scenarios will likely
emerge from this exercise.
In the first scenario, as the Titanic metaphor suggests, a
4°C warmer world raises the possibility that the actions we
should be taking now to promote survival equity (e.g., build
more lifeboats) are not the same as the actions we want to
take now to promote day-to-day social equity (e.g., ensure
more equitable access to societal amenities and, perhaps,
redress past exploitations). In a world of infinite time and
resources, of course, the world could pursue both sets of
actions and both equitable goals simultaneously.
The real world, however, is unlikely to have either all
the time or all the resources it needs to pursue both goals
to the extent necessary to actually achieve both forms of
social equity. Thus, if this scenario turns out to be generally true, then governments, politicians, and populations
face trade offs between the two equity goals and hard
choices regarding the resource allocations to each. In the
hardest of all scenarios, compromises in resource allocation
achieve neither goal, meaning that the world must prioritize between achieving day-to-day social equity in the near
term and ensuring the highest amount of survival equity
in the future.
The second scenario is the one most people will naturally intuit to be the true one—although following that
intuition without study is an impulse the world should
resist. In this scenario, improving day-to-day equity
now also promotes climate change survival equity later.
214. Ruhl & Craig, supra note 2, at 269-72.
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The Titanic metaphor elides this scenario because of the
immediacy of the oncoming iceberg catastrophe, but this
scenario incorporates a logical projection of causation:
improved day-to-day equity now will also, over time, dramatically improve the adaptive capacity of marginalized
and otherwise vulnerable groups and individuals to survive
a 4°C warmer world.
Indeed, this logic helps hone the narrative edge of one
of the opening scenes in Kim Stanley Robinson’s climate
fiction novel Ministry for the Future: during a disastrous
extreme heat wave in India, a lone American aid worker
survives being parboiled in the lake that everyone has
entered in an attempt to keep (relatively) cooler.215 As the
reader learns before this gruesome scene, the American has
been keeping the limited supply of cold, clean, freshwater
available at his office to himself, the last of which he takes
with him to the lake. As another character suggests later,
this relatively small advantage in hydration, coupled with
a lifetime of being well-fed and medically cared for in the
United States, might be the only explanation of why he
survived and the local Indians did not.
The third scenario is one that J.B. Ruhl and I raise in
4°C,216 which posits that a radically warmer world somewhat ironically creates exactly the disruptive opportunity
needed to both radicalize the pursuit of social equity and
make it possible for the world to shed the social and economic institutions and structures, such as institutionalized
racism, that currently thwart attempts to increase social
equity. In this scenario, the very dislocations and rearrangements that a 4°C warmer world demands in response
to its impacts are exactly what will allow the full range of
social transformations needed to greatly improve both dayto-day social equity—that is, the equitable distribution of
amenities and access to opportunity—and climate change
survival equity—that is, roughly equal odds that every
individual will survive and thrive in this hot new world.
In other words, there’s the distinct possibility that a
radical survival-based adaptation modality (what we call
redesign adaptation217) is what will finally allow for radical progress in day-to-day equity, somewhat analogous to
how the social transformations of World War II helped to
pave the way to the Civil Rights Movement. Somewhat
perversely, in this scenario, social equity would be the silver lining of the 4°C world, with all people simultaneously
sharing relatively equal access to amenities and opportunities and relatively equal chances of dying.
Planning for each of these scenarios, as well as research
into which is the most likely description of the temporal
relationship between day-to-day social equity and climate change survival equity, should begin now. While
the Parties attending the 26th Conference of Parties
(COP26) in November 2021 committed yet again to
keeping global average temperature increase to below
2°C, they also acknowledged that this goal “requires

215. Kim Stanley Robinson, Ministry for the Future 10-12 (2020).
216. Ruhl & Craig, supra note 2, at 267-69.
217. Id. at 244-46.
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‘rapid, deep, and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including reducing global
carbon dioxide emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 relative
to the 2010 level and to net zero around mid-century, as
well as deep reductions in other greenhouse gases.’”218 In
light of past failures to achieve ambitious climate change
mitigation goals, the world should also admit the possibility that we are in fact contemplating equity from the
deck of the Titanic, and that it’s time to start figuring
out the best way to ensure that more of the world’s most
vulnerable have access to lifeboats.

XV. Letting Go of 2°C, Letting Go of Race?
What Does Climate Justice Mean
at 4°C?
This section was authored by Clifford J. Villa, Ronald and
Susan Friedman Professor of Law, University of New Mexico
School of Law.
While the international scientific community urges the
need to contain global warming above pre-industrial levels to 1.5°C ideally, and 2°C at worst,219 current trajectories suggest we may go well beyond that.220 Taking a sober
assessment of continued global warming, J.B. Ruhl and
Robin Kundis Craig, in their provocative article 4°C,221
observe an “existential threat to democratic governance”
and posit the need for a reframing of established approaches
to climate adaptation. Beyond the “Three Rs” of resist, resilience, and retreat, Ruhl and Craig suggest the urgent need
for redesign,222 a process of radical transformation that may
require “letting go” of closely held beliefs, expectations,
and goals.223
Facing a future where “human suffering is likely to
increase dramatically,” the authors urge us to “ask uncomfortable questions,” and consider even the most politically unpopular measures in order to preserve democracy
through the cascade of change to come.224 For Ruhl and
Craig, necessary measures might include community
relocation and “repurposing public lands for new human
settlements.”225 Could the same dramatic changes in a 4°C
world also require letting go of race and ethnicity as central
constructs for pursuing climate justice?
For Ruhl and Craig, equity remains a fundamental
principle for the redesign process. They stipulate that any
successful redesign must maintain “opportunities and
support for individuals and communities that otherwise

218. Erin Grisby et al., The Results of COP26, Nat’l L. Rev. (Nov. 29, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/results-cop26.
219. IPCC, supra note 185, at 4-5.
220. See, e.g., id. at vi (reservedly acknowledging that “recent trends in emissions
and the level of international ambition . . . deviate from a track consistent
with limiting warming to well below 2°C”).
221. Ruhl & Craig, supra note 2, at 195.
222. Id. at 200-01.
223. Id. at 244.
224. Id. at 276.
225. Id.
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face significant risks of being ignored, overrun, forgotten,
left behind, or otherwise further marginalized.”226 In the
United States, historically “marginalized” communities
are often communities of color, including Black, Brown,
indigenous, and Asian-Pacific Islander communities. Recognition of the disproportionate impacts of environmental
pollution on communities of color gave rise to a movement
for “environmental justice” that took hold more than 30
years ago227 and remains as strong as ever today.228
Unlike the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s229 and
the environmental movement of the 1970s,230 the movement for environmental justice has never produced national
legislation like the Civil Rights Act of 1964231 or the Clean
Water Act of 1972 (CWA).232 Consequently, environmental
justice has remained a largely grassroots movement, driven
by community organizations and increasingly reflected
in state legislation.233 In the absence of national legislation, communities and scholars have long endeavored to
define “environmental justice.” According to the most
common definition, maintained by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and adopted by many states,
“[e]nvironmental justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color,
national origin, or income, with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental
laws, regulations, and policies.”234
One key element of this definition, embraced almost
universally by state law and policy, is the application to
“all people.” For the George W. Bush/Dick Cheney-era
EPA, “all people” rejected a conception of environmental
justice as a program of affirmative action with racial preferences.235 Perhaps unwittingly, “all people” also opened the
door to an inclusive conception of environmental justice as
a program intended to protect all people—all of them—to
include children, the elderly, the homeless, the undocumented, and LGBTQ communities.
In the past two decades, the movement for environmental justice has inspired allied “justice” movements,

226. Id. at 202.
227. See Clifford J. Villa, Remaking Environmental Justice, 66 Loy. L. Rev. 469,
481-89 (2020).
228. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13990, Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis, §1, 86 Fed. Reg.
7037 (Jan. 20, 2021) (presidential order asserting that “the Federal Government . . . must advance environmental justice”).
229. For useful background on the Civil Rights Movement, leading to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, see Gerald N. Rosenberg, The 1964 Civil Rights Act:
The Crucial Role of Social Movements in the Enactment and Implementation of
Anti-Discrimination Law, 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 1147 (2004).
230. For background on the environmental movement leading to passage of the
modern Clean Water Act in 1972, see William L. Andreen, The Evolution of
Water Pollution Control in the United States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts,
1789-1972, Part I, 22 Stan. Env’t L. Rev. 145 (2003).
231. 42 U.S.C. §2000a.
232. 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, ELR Stat. FWPCA §§101-607.
233. For an excellent summary of recent environmental justice legislation among
the states, see Michael B. Gerrard & Edward McTiernan, Emerging StateLevel Environmental Justice Laws, 265 N.Y. L.J. 91 (2021).
234. See U.S. EPA, Environmental Justice, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice (last updated Dec. 16, 2021).
235. Villa, supra note 227, at 496.
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such as “climate justice,”236 “food justice,”237 and “energy
justice.”238 As with environmental justice, climate justice has been the subject of numerous efforts to define it.
According to one simple definition, “[c]limate justice can
be defined generally as addressing the disproportionate
burden of climate change impacts on poor and marginalized communities.”239 Other scholars have submitted that
“[a]s an extension of environmental justice, climate justice
is understood to focus on ‘equal rights and opportunities
[for] every individual to seek a high quality of life under the
impacts of global climate change.’”240
This inclusive conception of climate justice as applicable to “every individual” presents particular challenges
for the 4°C future. How do we pursue a “high quality of
life” and keep “every individual” safe from the impacts of a
new climate regime that human civilization has never seen?
Climate models abound, but climbing past 2°C and the
tipping points of nonlinear change, how will we know what
to look for, much less how to mitigate the worst impacts?
While acknowledging the “no-analog future,”241 we
can usefully examine experiences of the past and present
to locate specific examples of disproportionate impacts
from climate change, identify underlying causes for these
impacts, and eliminate or mitigate such disparities in the
future. For example:
• In 2005, Hurricane Katrina (and the anemic Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) response)
resulted in infamously disproportionate impacts
among the Black population of New Orleans. Race
discrimination operated systemically to place Black
people in harm’s way and acted implicitly to frustrate
recovery efforts. But in terms of keeping people safe,
Black and white, more lives might have been saved
immediately by concentrating rescue operations on
elderly people,242 the population most likely to have
impaired mobility.
• In 2017, in the wake of Hurricane Maria, studies
indicated that two of the strongest indicators for
mortality among hurricane victims were diabetes and
heart disease.243 While federal regulations often de236. See, e.g., Clifford J. Villa et al., Environmental Justice: Law, Policy
& Regulation ch. 14 (3d ed. 2020).
237. See, e.g., id. ch. 16.
238. See, e.g., Carmen G. Gonzalez et al., Energy Justice: US and International Perspectives (2018).
239. Randall S. Abate et al., Recent Developments in Climate Justice, 47 ELR
11005 (Dec. 2017).
240. Uma Outka & Elizabeth Kronk Warner, Reversing Course on Environmental
Justice Under the Trump Administration, 54 Wake Forest L. Rev. 393, 417
(2019).
241. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building
Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (2008); Douglas Fox,
Back to the No-Analog Future?, 316 Science 823 (2007).
242. See Myles Maltz, Caught in the Eye of the Storm: The Disproportionate Impact of Natural Disasters on the Elderly Population in the United States, 27
Elder L.J. 157 (2019) (noting that “elderly individuals over the age of sixty
represent[ed] 71% of the fatalities in Hurricane Katrina”).
243. Raul Cruz-Cano & Erin L. Mead, Causes of Excess Deaths in Puerto Rico
After Hurricane Maria: A Time-Series Estimation, 109 Am. J. Pub. Health
1050 (2019).
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fine Puerto Ricans as “minorities,”244 a focus on such
“minority” status would not allow federal responders
to direct resources toward those individuals in Puerto
Rico most likely in need of immediate, life-saving
care after Hurricane Maria.
• In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in particularly devastating impacts on Black, Brown, and
indigenous communities. The coronavirus itself did
not discriminate by race, but researchers identified
important conditions that made some racial and ethnic subpopulations more vulnerable than others. Researchers from the Harvard School of Public Health,
for example, found a strong correlation between COVID-19 death rates and air pollution, with poor air
quality more likely found in communities of color.245
Another study by the University of Southern California Department of Preventive Medicine revealed
that Latinos in California between the ages of 20 to
54 have died from COVID-19 at a rate more than
eight times higher than for non-Hispanic whites of
the same age range,246 due to factors including differential access to health care, mutigenerational households, and greater exposure to the public as “essential
workers.”247
• In late June 2021, the unprecedented heat wave experienced in the Pacific Northwest, with all-time
high temperatures in British Columbia, Oregon, and
Washington, resulted in strongly disparate impacts
upon the elderly. According to one preliminary report, excessive heat—including a temperature of 116°
Fahrenheit (F) on June 28—was directly responsible
for 54 deaths in the Portland metro area.248 Of these
deaths, 81.5% were people ages 60 or older.249 According to the report, “[l]ack of air conditioning was
a key driver in mortality. Whereas about 80 percent
of people in the Portland area have some level of air
conditioning in their homes . . . , none of those who
died had central air, and only eight people had a portable air conditioning unit in their home.”250

244. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. §81.2 (2021) (defining “Minority” to include “a person
of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other
Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race”).
245. Xiao Wu et al., Air Pollution and COVID-19 Mortality in the United States:
Strengths and Limitations of an Ecological Regression Analysis, 6 Sci. Advances 45 (2020).
246. Erika Garcia et al., COVID-19 Mortality in California Based on Death Certificates: Disproportionate Impacts Across Racial/Ethnic Groups and Nativity,
58 Annals Epidemiology 69, 71 (2021).
247. Id. at 74. See also Laura Gómez, Anti-Latino Racism, the Racial State, and
Revising Approaches to “Racial Disparities,” 28 Pub. Health Mgmt. & Prac.
S9, S12 (2022) (observing that “[i]n stark contrast to White deaths, Latino
deaths from COVID-19 were among younger people who were unable to
work at home because they were essential workers, were unable to self-quarantine at home when they or someone they share a home with was exposed,
or unable to alter public transportation habits or afford to use grocery and
other product deliver services”).
248. Multnomah County, Preliminary Review on Excessive Heat Deaths
7 (2021).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 9.
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Significantly, and defying traditional notions about climate justice, the preliminary report found that recorded
deaths from the extreme heat in Portland were 92% white
as well as 63% male.251 While these findings surely reflect
the particular demographics of Portland, Oregon, they
may also remind us that race and ethnicity will not always
predict, and help us prevent, all the worst impacts from climate change, particularly in the 4°C future (which in some
ways is already here with 116°F in Portland).
A different approach may be grounded in vulnerability
theory, pioneered by scholars including Martha Albertson
Fineman.252 Vulnerability theory looks beyond suspect
classes, such as race, to understand why certain groups or
individuals may be more susceptible than others to particular impacts in certain circumstances. Vulnerability theory
has only recently received consideration in the context of
environmental justice,253 and it remains ripe for exploration
in the context of climate justice. Through vulnerability
theory, we may understand why white males experienced
greater mortality from the 2021 heat wave in the Pacific
Northwest or why Latinos may suffer most with increasing
heat year after year in the Southwest.254 Investigating climate justice through the lens of vulnerability theory leads
necessarily to heavily contextual inquiries, eschewing generalizations and replacing suppositions with careful observations, analyses, and recommended actions.
One timely example may be illustrative. In certain
regions, families commonly pass down real property from
one generation to the next with minimal documentation
of title. In the Deep South, “heirs property” often reflects
the Jim Crow era, when Black people were excluded from
the legal system.255 Today, this system of property ownership has left many homeowners (including many people
of color) more vulnerable to disasters following climaterelated events such as hurricanes.256 After the devastation
wrought by Hurricane Ida in August 2021, FEMA finally
changed its policy, allowing disaster survivors alternate
forms of documentation to establish home ownership.257
This welcome change in FEMA policy addresses a vulnerability factor grounded in historic race discrimination but
persisting in new needs to prove property ownership.

251. Id. at 7.
252. See, e.g., Martha Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1 (2008).
253. See, e.g., Villa, supra note 227, at 509-16.
254. See John Dialesandro et al., Dimensions of Thermal Inequities: Neighborhood
Social Demographics and Urban Heat in the Southwestern U.S., 18 Int’l J.
Env’t Rsch. & Pub. Health 941 (2021).
255. “The Real Damage”: Why FEMA Is Denying Disaster Aid to Black Families That Have Lived for Generations in the Deep South, Wash. Post (July
11, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/07/11/femablack-owned-property/.
256. Ivis Garcia, The Lack of Proof of Ownership in Puerto Rico Is Crippling Repairs
in the Aftermath of Hurricane Maria, A.B.A. Hum. Rts. (May 21, 2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_
magazine_home/vol--44--no-2--housing/the-lack-of-proof-of-ownershipin-puerto-rico-is-crippling-repai/.
257. Press Release, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS Announces
Changes to Individual Assistance Policies to Advance Equity for Disaster
Survivors (Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/09/02/dhs-announces-changes-individual-assistance-policies-advance-equity-disaster.
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So, will keeping people safe in the 4°C world require
letting go of race? Given our history in the United States,
including the racist histories we have only begun to
acknowledge,258 the answer must be “no,” we cannot let go
of race. To survive and thrive in the “no-analog future” will
take everything we’ve got. We will need artists, economists,
engineers, lawyers, historians, and health professionals,259
as well as governance on all levels, the private sector, and
community organizations. No one person needs to do it
all. But we will still need some people to keep an eye on
race to continue remedying mistakes of the past and help
us avoid mistakes in our future. As Ruhl and Craig observe
in conclusion, “We can do better to prepare the nation for
the path to 4°C.”260 Preparing for that future may require
letting go of some old notions and modes of inquiry, but
may also require holding onto some lessons from the past.

XVI. Catastrophic Inequality in a
Climate-Changed Future
This section was authored by Shi-Ling Hsu, D’Alemberte
Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.
Climate change has consistently proven to be more extreme
than climate models have projected.261 If this trend toward
extremely unpleasant surprises holds, more drastic adaptive responses will be required. Climate change poses an
existential threat to human societies because it disrupts the
supply of natural resources that provide basic life necessities
such as water, food, energy, and housing. At least in affluent countries, these necessities are abundant enough to be
readily available for a vast majority of their populations.
But in a climate-changed future, with floods, droughts,
hurricanes, wildfires, and extreme heat disrupting the supply and production of life necessities, availability could
become sporadic and uncertain. Wildfires, drought, and
extreme heat could combine to significantly suppress California agricultural production, which accounts for oneseventh (by value) of all American agricultural products.262
Unfortunately, demand for life necessities is very strong at
low quantities—they are necessities, after all. Shortages will
drive up prices sharply, posing hardships for many and pos258. See, e.g., Adam Heavin, Preface, 56 Tulsa L. Rev. vii (2021) (observing
that, after the night of the Tulsa Race Massacre on May 31, 1921, when
hundreds of Black Americans were murdered in the community known as
“Black Wall Street,” the “Massacre was scarcely reported in the news. . . .
Even today, it’s not uncommon to come across native Tulsans who were
unaware of the event until recently, as the Tulsa Race Massacre is rarely
discussed in Tulsa classrooms”).
259. For an exploration of the roles that health professionals may play in helping
to prepare communities for the climate future, see the Building Resilience
Against Climate Effects (BRACE) Framework developed by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, available at https://www.cdc.gov/climateandhealth/BRACE.htm (last reviewed Sept. 9, 2019).
260. Ruhl & Craig, supra note 2, at 282.
261. Noah S. Diffenbaugh, Verification of Extreme Event Attribution: Using Outof-Sample Observations to Assess Changes in Probabilities of Unprecedented
Events, 6 Sci. Advances (2020), https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/
sciadv.aay2368.
262. USDA Economic Research Service, Cash Receipts by Commodity, State Ranking, https://data.ers.usda.gov/reports.aspx?ID=17844 (last updated Dec. 1,
2021).
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ing severe hardships for poor households. With inequality
measured less by wealth and more by probabilities of survival, unrest will follow.
Governments can avert this kind of catastrophic inequality by proactively developing a capacity to be a supplier of
last resort for basic life necessities. It can do this by creating a trust instrument with the ability to step in to produce or supply basic life necessities should shortages occur.
Importantly, such an instrument, which I have dubbed
a “resources trust,”263 should not normally interfere with
ongoing market or administrative processes that supply
life necessities; only when certain signs of shortage appear
should a resources trust spring into action and inject some
emergency supply. Also importantly, the amount supplied
need not be very large. A resources trust need not make
up every shortfall; it need only inject enough supplemental supply to lower the prices of life necessities to nearly
normal levels. The demand for life necessities flattens out
quickly once basic needs are met.
A resources trust is essentially an emergency standby
supply of vital life necessities, an effective reserve for the
growing number of emergencies in a climate-changed
future. It is a tricky proposition to be able to produce, but
to minimize interference with existing markets. But it can
be accomplished by an astute collection of rights, options,
and technologies. For example, a resources trust can assemble a portfolio of water options, which can be exercised in
shortage situations. Or a resources trust could do what
some billionaire investors are already doing: buy land with
appurtenant water rights264 for production or for speculative purposes,265 so as to be able to maintain some capacity
for extracting water or growing food.
Alternatively, a resources trust can also develop and
deploy some backstop technologies266 that only become
economical at higher prices. Fortunately, that is what a
resources trust is supposed to do: spring into action only
when shortages have driven up prices, threatening the budgets of many households, but especially poor ones. One
backstop technology that could be deployed to address
potential water shortages is desalination267: while typically
more expensive than traditional means of supplying water,
in a shortage situation with high prices for water, it can
mean the difference between life and death. This is how
climate change will be a great un-equalizer for even affluent countries.
263. Hsu, supra note 31.
264. Russell Gold, Harvard Quietly Amasses California Vineyards—and the
Water Underneath, Wall St. J. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/harvard-quietly-amasses-california-vineyardsand-the-water-underneath-1544456396.
265. Nathaniel Lee, Here’s Why the Ultra-Wealthy Like Bill Gates and Thomas
Peterffy Are Investing in U.S. Farmland, CNBC (Aug. 26, 2021), https://
www.cnbc.com/2021/08/20/heres-why-the-ultra-wealthy-like-bill-gatesinvesting-to-farmland.html.
266. Carolyn Fischer & Stephen W. Salant, Alternative Climate Policies
and Intertemporal Emissions Leakage: Quantifying the Green Paradox (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 12-16, 2012), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2047077.
267. Menachem Elimelech & William A. Phillip, The Future of Seawater Desalination: Energy, Technology, and the Environment, 333 Science 712 (2011),
available at https://www.science.org/doi/abs/10.1126/science.1200488.
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A resources trust might also adopt the backstop technology of greenhouse agriculture,268 a seemingly simple
technology, but in a modern society, a source of innovation and productivity gains over conventional technology.
Greenhouse agriculture has enabled the tiny country of the
Netherlands to be a world food export juggernaut, a fairly
close second269 to the United States.270 Having a low footprint and low maintenance needs, greenhouse agriculture
is capable of operating at low production levels until it is
needed to ramp up quickly and produce at high quantities.
Another backstop technology that a resources trust
might employ to be a supplemental energy supplier is the
wide-scale adoption of energy storage, or batteries. Wind
and solar energy are abundantly available, and if excess
wind- or solar-generated electricity can be stored, they can
provide a crucial reserve for emergencies during climate
events such as hurricanes, wildfires, floods, or extreme
heat, in which electricity shortages might occur. Fortunately, energy storage technologies are advancing rapidly,271
so batteries might be situated in enough places to overcome
transmission problems. A resources trust could, at reasonable cost, maintain significant reserves of electricity in a
multitude of locations for use in times of shortage. Batteries could be installed in certain locations to guard against
the common occurrence of electricity blackouts disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations.
Housing presents unique issues for a resources trust, as
the history of government-subsidized housing is, on balance, disappointing. However, climate change is a uniquely
existential threat, and shelter is such a basic human need
that governments cannot shrink from being a provider of
last resort. If, as expected, extreme weather, floods, wildfires, and other climate events become more frequent and
more severe in the future, they may increase losses of housing by sufficient amounts to necessitate some response from
a resources trust. It is worth keeping in mind that disaster
responses have always involved the provision of some shelter, whether it be massive cooling stations, temporary shelters, or, more ignominiously, the Louisiana Superdome.
Resources-trust provision of housing is just a difference in
degree and, hopefully, in quality.
A resources trust appears to be a foreign concept, but
it is really only different in degree from other government
instruments intended to provide in times of need. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is one analogous instrument. If
it weren’t so ironic, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve could
be considered an emergency source of energy for times
of climate crisis. Sovereign wealth provides another analogy, collecting excise taxes in small amounts and invest-

268. Frank Viviano, This Tiny Country Feeds the World, Nat’l Geographic
(Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/article/
holland-agriculture-sustainable-farming.
269. Agricultural Exports Worth Nearly €92 Billion in 2017, Gov’t Neth.
(Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2018/01/19/
agricultural-exports-worth-nearly-%E2%82%AC92-billion-in-2017.
270. USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, GATS Home, https://apps.fas.usda.
gov/gats/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
271. Energy Storage Association, Why Energy Storage, https://energystorage.org/
why-energy-storage/technologies/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
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ing them in accordance with a charter setting forth some
future, provisional purpose.272 A resources trust is just an
extension of the sovereign wealth concept, albeit one with
complications extending beyond financial investments.
However, governments must be able to respond to
the existential threats posed by climate change. Climate
change threatens to impose vast harms upon everybody,
but the most immediate and existential threats are borne
by the most vulnerable. If government cannot ensure the
availability of basic life necessities to its citizens, rich or
poor, it becomes a failed state. Inequality of wealth is one
thing; inequality of survival prospects is wholly another.
Unrest will follow.

XVII. Precommitment Strategies to Avoid
the Justice Worst Case in the Climate
Worst Case
This section was authored by Katrina Kuh, Haub Distinguished
Professor of Environmental Law, Elisabeth Haub School of
Law, Pace University.
Open-eyed assessment of the potential for and on-theground realities of 4°C of warming supports the implementation of extraordinary and immediate mitigation
measures, and portends that even with such measures,
climate impacts will strain adaptive capacity to the breaking point and beyond, resulting in significant societal
dislocation and loss and damage. In both contexts—the
implementation of extraordinary mitigation measures and
adaptation to high-level warming—urgency and need have
the potential to sideline or overwhelm justice.
In the context of extraordinary mitigation, environmental review processes and community engagement—
important mechanisms for surfacing and preventing
environmental injustice—are already eyed warily as speed
bumps to be streamlined, truncated, or waived to avoid
impeding the rapid deployment of mitigation infrastructure. In the context of adaptation to high-level warming,
societies will transition from a steady state punctuated by
the need to manage periodic emergencies to a near-constant
state of managing emergency. Responses to the pandemic
reveal the ease with which emergency can overwhelm justice. Vaccine nationalism evidences the instinctive national
hoarding borne of unfolding emergency; domestically, the
pandemic’s disproportionate impact on low-income communities and communities of color illustrates emergency’s
exacerbation of vulnerability.
It is hard to imagine that, faced with successive and
deepening domestic climate emergencies (and resulting
internal displacement, food insecurity, and political instability), a 4°C United States will have the inclination or
resources to send adaptation assistance abroad, regardless
of the relatively more severe harms befalling its developing
country neighbors and its conceded role in exacerbating
272. Hsu, supra note 31.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4053843

52 ELR 10237

Copyright © 2022 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

those harms. And it is easy to imagine how, within the
United States, scarcity and struggle could sap the motivation and capacity to attend to justice. The best intentions—for example, to manage internal migration to
support successful relocation by low-income communities,
avoid climate gentrification, and prevent receiving locations from adopting discriminatory policies, a tricky task
in the best of times—may yield to the urgency of other,
more pressing adaptation needs.
Can we prevent the urgency of avoiding the climate
worst case, and then the exigencies of adapting to it, from
eclipsing justice? Incorporating binding precommitments
to rough justice, triggered and enforceable through automatic processes and made in the relative cool of now as
opposed to the heat of later, into mitigation and adaptation
law could help. Key aspects of a precommitment might
include that it should be binding (not easily reversed—
set out in statute as opposed to regulation, for example),
automatic (trigger a clear and measurable outcome or
duty that is not dependent on the exercise of discretion),
and early (the commitment should be made prior to the
circumstance(s) in which it would be implemented). Such
precommitment strategies are unlikely to achieve fully just
outcomes (and might best be accompanied by other, more
typical mechanisms for advancing justice), but they could
help to prevent least-just outcomes. (Of note, the phrase
“precommitment strategy” is used here in a broad sense
and does not refer specifically to restraints on future legislative action, although some advocate for such precommitment approaches to buttress climate mitigation policy273;
however, the concept is similar.)
New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act provides an example of a precommitment
to justice, as well as examples of more typical efforts to
advance justice, that might prove less durable in the face
of high-level warming. The statute provides that disadvantaged communities “shall receive no less than thirty-five
percent of the overall benefits of spending on clean energy
and energy efficiency programs,” giving statutory force to
the recognition that environmental justice includes equitable distribution of benefits.274 This precommitment is
automatic, binding, and early—a clear duty, enshrined in
statute, and decided prior to the distribution of funds. The
statute contains many other mechanisms for incorporating justice into mitigation and adaptation policy, some of
which come close to a precommitment to justice by mandating a relatively clear duty and others that require too
much judgment or discretion in their application to be
considered automatic.
For example, in developing regulations to implement
statewide GHG emission limits, the Department of Environmental Conservation is required to “[e]nsure that activities undertaken to comply with the regulations do not result
in a net increase in co-pollutant emissions.”275 The bar on
273. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining
the Present to Liberate the Future, 40 ELR 10749 (Aug. 2010).
274. N.Y. Env’t Conserv. Law §75-0117 (McKinney 2021).
275. Id. §75-0109.
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an increase in co-pollutants constitutes a relatively clear
statutory command, but the need to evaluate whether and
how the Department’s regulations prompt an increase in
co-pollutants introduces some uncertainty about the automaticity of the command—whether its violation would be
clear and the command readily enforceable. The Department is also exhorted to “[p]rioritize measures to maximize
net reductions of greenhouse gas emissions and co-pollutants in disadvantaged communities,” a charge that is not
sufficiently clear to constitute a precommitment.276 All of
these efforts to advance justice through mitigation and
adaptation policy are good; the present point is simply that
precommitments may prove especially durable and valuable as we face high-level warming.
What might precommitments to justice look like in
other contexts? With respect to the knotty problem of
balancing fulsome review with speed in siting and deploying mitigation and adaptation infrastructure (knotty in
part because there are important justice values served by
achieving rapid, effective mitigation and adaptation), a
precommitment to justice might take the form of preserving process where it is most likely to serve justice (i.e., by
streamlining, truncating, or waiving environmental review
processes except in environmental justice communities). So,
a high-voltage transmission line (or an industrial-scale solar
array or wind farm or grid-scale battery storage) would be
eligible for streamlined review and process if located to
avoid environmental justice communities.
This would create a disincentive to locate undesirable
mitigation infrastructure in environmental justice communities, thereby countering the many forces that tend
to pull such undesirable land uses to them, like low cost
and less-effective community opposition. And it would
preserve process for communities most likely to need the
protection that process can afford because the interests of
their residents are less well-represented in upstream decisionmaking, community members are not positioned to
access other levers of power to prevent harms, and they
may be more likely to already be suffering from cumulative
environmental harms.
Precommitments might also—building on the idea
that they should be early in time—take the form of automatic transfers that occur only if/when certain warming
thresholds are crossed (contingency). Efforts by low-lying
island states to seek compensation for loss and damage
have gained little traction on the world stage, despite the
strong moral claim that underlies them and the foreseeable perils these nations face. (Although loss and damage
is addressed in Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, the decision adopting the Paris Agreement states that “Article 8 of
the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any
liability or compensation.”277)

276. Id.
277. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the
Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris From 30
November to 11 December 2015, 51 U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1
(Dec. 12, 2015).
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But what if low-lying island states proposed that polar
assets, increasingly valuable in a warming world and subject to disputed claims of ownership, be understood to constitute a common heritage of mankind except that interests
in those polar assets (ownership, shares, a mechanism
for profit sharing) are to be automatically transferred to
citizens of low-lying island states should certain warming
thresholds be crossed and/or climate impacts realized? An
early, contingent precommitment may reduce opposition
(states aren’t being asked to transfer wealth now or perhaps ever) and create a global incentive to mitigate to avoid
crossing those thresholds.
Or imagine adopting, as an adaptation policy now, a
contingent precommitment to grant title in public land
in climate-safe(r) locations upon the crossing of identified
climate thresholds to tribes whose sovereign lands become
uninhabitable as a result of climate change. This could be
done without requiring tribes to cede ownership of or formally abandon land to which they are deeply connected—
even uninhabitable areas might retain significant value for
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visitation to maintain a connection to place—and thereby
perhaps encourage safer, earlier relocation.
As pie-in-the-sky as some of these ideas sound, achieving just outcomes may be more in reach now than it
will become in the decades to come—in the heat of the
moment, competing against a multitude of pressing climate concerns. Any precommitment strategy would, of
course, need to be carefully examined in the context in
which it is being deployed. With respect to environmental
review for mitigation infrastructure, for example, delaying infrastructure deployment could negatively impact
justice by exacerbating climate change and its impacts on
the most vulnerable; care would also need to be taken not
to drive green investment away from environmental justice
communities, resulting in a loss of economic opportunity.
And it should be conceded that precommitment strategies
can’t satisfy all justice values; we should continue to push
for more. But perhaps we should also hedge our bets by
locking in a modicum of rough justice.
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